

FACT-FINDING PAPER
ON CRIME PREVENTION

CRIME PREVENTION
A job for the police and YOU.

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National Crime Prevention Coordination Bureau
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PREFACE

In October 1979 a small group of departmental officials from both our ministries got together for an exchange of ideas lasting several days in October 1979. Their purpose was to "list" the jobs that would arise - first of all for the National Crime Prevention Bureau - from the adoption of the Police (Crime Prevention) Regulations.

In addition to matters of an internal organisational nature, Crime Prevention methods and the functioning of a supporting organisation for the Dutch police formed two main courses in the menu.

What emerged was the fact-finding paper on Prevention of Offences, in February 1980, and the paper on "A model for Crime Prevention Coordination", both from the bureau of the national Crime Prevention coordinator and intended for internal discussion and comment.

As we believed that opinion-making on this subject should also involve people outside the Departments, these papers were circulated to the members of the Central Crime Prevention Committee, the National Crime Prevention Contact Committee, the Police Committee of the Netherlands Local Authorities Association and individual police chiefs, burgomasters and members of the Public Prosecutions Department, as far as we were asked for them.

What comments were received on the papers were mostly very much in agreement.

The criticism received has also been taken into account in the Fact-finding Paper on Crime Prevention presented herewith.

We gladly ask your attention for this Paper. In our view, the prevention of offences is one of the areas which for understandable reasons has lagged behind in the progress of crime prevention. The presentation of views on how this subject can be dealt with fits completely into the context of our strategy, which is aimed at providing thorough support for local activities.

The principal purpose of this paper is therefore to encourage opinion-making on the subject rather than to prescribe a working method.

We hope that this paper, which is intended merely as an introduction to systematic crime prevention, will be a contribution to the extension of activities showing that the authorities cannot adopt a passive attitude in resisting the socially undesirable phenomenon of crime.

Minister of Justice

Minister of Home Affairs

INTRODUCTION

The scope of "Crime Prevention" operations may be very wide and is at first sight extremely difficult to take stock of.

In my initial exploratory talks with Crime Prevention officials in 1977 I too quickly laboured under the delusion that I understood what it was all about. I told my wife after such talks that Crime Prevention amounted to security and information.

Locks, advertisements and stickers in other words. Such an impression - I soon found out - in no way did justice to what the officials concerned were actually doing. It seemed like a description by a visitor from a planet where illness is unknown, who sees a doctor at work: "He is writing (prescriptions) and hence he is a writer".

Subsequent talks with police officers and others taught me that I was not the only one who had difficulty in discovering the actual pattern of operations behind the outward features of Crime Prevention.

The present paper is an attempt to set forth this pattern. For clarity, it should be emphasised that this is nothing new, it is not an innovation. The pattern itself existed long before the Departments paid attention to Crime Prevention. It was rather like an unmapped area of the inhabited world. The inhabitants of this world, the original Crime Prevention pioneers, partly retired from office on grounds of age, have the honour of having developed Crime Prevention as a systematised part of police duties.

The present paper, on which the members of my bureau have also worked together, endeavours to make this development and reactions to it from "the field" available to a wider circle of those involved.

After a brief historic review and an indication of the principal objectives of Crime Prevention, prevention methods are gone into in rather greater detail. This concentrates on (more comprehensive) project-wise activities. Annex 1 elaborates this method more fully as a number of steps for the interested reader.

The paper also devotes attention to the coordinating and supporting function of local, regional and national Crime Prevention officers.

My colleagues and I will be glad to receive any observations and comments.

R.J. Vader

National Crime Prevention Coordinator.

SECTION 1: WHAT IS CRIME PREVENTION

1.1. Historical background

In the Netherlands, crime prevention was traditionally mainly of a repressive nature. In the 'fifties, however, people started wondering whether, as in Britain for instance, more attention ought to be paid to preventive work in addition to repression^{x)}.

This line of thought took firmer shape in 1957^{xx)}. From then until 1978 about thirty Crime Prevention bureaus had been set up in municipal and national police forces. As an increasing need was found for coordinating these bureaus, it was decided in 1968 to set up an Intermunicipal Crime Prevention Committee.

The next step towards more comprehensive and nationally coordinated crime prevention was in 1970. The Criminal Investigation Advisory Committee (R.A.C.) set up a working party to go further into the prevention of offences. It reached the conclusion that there was a pressing need in this country for crime prevention and that it was advisable to set up a national organisation. These conclusions were passed on by the R.A.C. as recommendations to the Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs. But any more lengthy preparations were required before the National Crime Prevention Organisation became a fact.

In 1978, the Intermunicipal Crime Prevention Committee was disbanded. This roughly coincided with the beginning of the hearings for draft Crime Prevention regulations. The year after, the two Ministers adopted the "Police (Crime Prevention) Regulations". These established a national organisational crime prevention structure. Prevention grew, however, further than these Regulations.

x) It is by no means the intention to treat prevention as the opposite of repression; the relationship between these two concepts will be gone into further in 1.2..

xx) See the report "Research into the desirability and possibility in the municipal police forces of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht of setting up crime prevention advisory bureaus", Municipal Police Amsterdam, 1957.

Crime Prevention has gradually come to be regarded as a discipline: in 1979 the "Crime Prevention" course (for police officers working on prevention) became a regular part of training at the criminal investigation college in Zutphen.

At the international level, too, there has been greater interest in the prevention of offences. The Cranfield Conferences on the Prevention of Crime in Europe are held to encourage this. Arising from these conferences, the Council of Europe set up a coordinating body^{xxx)} in which this country is represented.

1.2. Definition and principal objectives of prevention

The prevention of all offences is of course impossible. In every society, rules are inevitably infringed to a greater or less extent. The following definition of prevention has been chosen:

Prevention is the relative or absolute reduction of the risk of offences being committed and limitation of the material and non-material damage that may arise from offences.

- In this definition the term "risk" links up with other threats: offences are only one of the threats that may inconvenience the public.

For instance, a miner exposes himself to the risk of getting pneumoconiosis and weighs this against the risk of unemployment; a retailer who displays his wares in a tempting manner thinks the risk of becoming a victim of shoplifting may weigh less heavily than the risk of losing custom.

This aspect of weighing the risks is reverted to in Section 2.

- As the definition indicates, reduction of the risk of offences occurring can be regarded in absolute and relative terms. In absolute terms it means that there is a reduction in the number of crimes, for instance in 1981 compared with 1980. In the relative sense it means

xxx) "Committee of Experts on Co-operation between the public and the police in the prevention of crime".

there may have been an increase for example in the number of offences in one year compared with another, but that the percentage increase is less and a rising trend is therefore reversed.

- The two principal objectives of prevention are given in the definition:

(1) the relative or absolute reduction of the risk of offences being committed.

(2) the reduction of the material and non-material damage^{x)} that may arise from offences.

Every prevention project will have to watch both these objectives. Attainment of the first objective does not automatically mean that the second is met as well.

A simple example will illustrate this:

Suppose a police officer has advised the power company to strengthen lamp standards in order to prevent vandalism. The result is that the number of cases of damage to these objects decreases by 25%. Unfortunately, the repair costs caused by the average damage to the new, strengthened type of standard prove to be 75% higher. This example clearly shows that the two objectives of prevention may be incompatible.

Besides this, there is the danger of side-effects. Suppose, for instance, that a publicity campaign directed at motorists reduces the number of thefts from cars and the consequential loss. As a result of the campaign, however, the perpetrators have turned their attention to stealing mopeds.

Such side-effects, too, may be incompatible with the objectives of prevention. This problem is reverted to in the model procedure dealt with in Section 2.

x) At present it can be stated that the emphasis in preventive work is put on material damage. It is much more easy to measure than non-material damage such as feelings of uneasiness among the public. Nevertheless, prevention will have to take into account the non-material damage accompanying offences. There is a danger, for instance, that not well thought-out publicity campaigns concerning specific offences may miss their point and in fact increase feelings of public uneasiness. Measurement and assessment of non-material damage therefore requires further elaboration.

It may be appropriate, with reference to the definition, to end this section by discussing the question of how prevention and repression are interrelated.

Some people look upon prevention and repression as direct opposites others as indistinguishable unities. But two arguments can be advanced with which these two views can be differentiated.

In the first place, prevention and repression can be conceived of as phases in a time-process. Prevention is aimed basically at what may happen: repression at what has happened.

Effective repression can of course have a preventive effect as well, because it acts as a deterrent. In this case repression is a measure with a preventive side-effect.

The second argument relates to the fact that repression is allotted solely to the police and the courts, whereas prevention is the duty of the entire community, of which the police and the courts of course form part.^{x)}

Prevention and repression are not therefore opposites; but the overlapping working areas are defined differently.

This definition of the area of preventive work will be described in more detail in the next section.

1.3. What offences are selected for prevention?

Prevention may be directed to a wide spectrum of offences.^{xx)}

Table 1 lists the subjects with which the experienced Crime Prevention officers on the experimental crime prevention course in December 1978 were dealing with in practice.

x) It may be noted that it is generally accepted that the police and the courts have at least a diagnostic task as regards prevention.

xx) It does not in fact matter that one offence qualifies as a crime and another as an offence.

Table 1:

List of offences to which one or more police forces in the Netherlands paid preventive attention.

- fraud/fraudulent conversion
- bicycle thefts
- moped thefts
- thefts from cars
- car thefts
- lorries
- shop thefts by staff
- shoplifting
- theft in and from factories
- theft on building sites
- pickpocketing/bag snatching
- cloakroom thefts
 - changing rooms
 - hospitals
 - catering establishments
- theft of/from boats
- outboard motors
- bank etc. messengers
- extortion
- containers
- shipments
- street robberies
- bank hold-ups
- burglary/entry in:
 - flats
 - houses
 - basements
 - offices
 - business premises
 - schools
 - factory and other grounds
 - banks
 - shopwindows

- property damage
 - industrial crime (phone-tapping, espionage)
 - arson
 - traffic crimes
 - drinking
 - failing to stop after accidents
 - preventive driver behaviour
 - juveniles
 - group offences
 - bomb alarms
 - seduction/sexual offences with minors
 - executive protection
 - drugs
-

In order to demarcate the wide operational area somewhat it may be as well to discuss via two "inputs" a number of considerations that may play a part in this. Firstly, a line of argument is given which may answer the question whether a particular offence can in fact be prevented. Next, the setting of priorities for preventing specific offences is discussed. A choice of these is, of course, a matter of local policy.

These considerations are given in the following outline:

A. To what extent is it possible to prevent an offence.

- The probability of an offence is a major factor in this;

B. To what extent, having regard to policy, is it desirable or necessary to try to prevent an offence.

The following points may be of importance:

- the seriousness of an offence;
- the percentage of offenders who are juveniles;
- extent and trend of an offence.

A. To what extent is it possible to prevent a crime?

To answer this question it will be useful to split the notion of an offence into four elements:

- offender or offenders: the person or persons committing an offence.

The characteristics of offenders include the potential way in which they can be approached, and the *modus operandi*.

- victim or victims: the person or persons experiencing direct inconvenience, loss or damage from the offence.

- NOTE: It might be argued in the case of shoplifting that the "customer" is often the ultimate victim. But it is a matter of the direct sufferer, and this is the shopkeeper or the management of the department store.

- location or locations: the place or places where the offence is committed. A location can be typified with the aid of physical characteristics (for example: dark, quiet, and so on).

- time: the time at which the offence is committed.

Crime prevention will always have to be centred on one or more of these elements, mainly involving of course potential offenders, victims, locations and times^{x)}.

It is very important for there to be a certain knowledge of these elements, as it will lead to a certain probability of the particular offence.

Two examples will make it clear that probability plays a major part in the question whether an offence lends itself to prevention:

(1) in the offence of "driving while intoxicated" the probability is as follows:

- offenders: drivers who have drunk too much;
- victims: not known;
- location: a concentration in urban entertainment centres.
- time: especially after midnight at weekends.

x) For completeness, it should be noted that prevention will never concentrate solely on the "time" element.

Breath etc. tests are in fact an example of both repressive and preventive approach to driving while intoxicated, based on location and time elements^{x)}. Many checks are made at weekends after midnight on roads leading from city centres.

(2) The second example relates to damage to telephone kiosks.

Suppose that all telephone kiosks in a given municipality are sometimes damaged. Post Office Telephones officials know that much more damage is usually done to telephone kiosks in dark, remote places. They also know that a number of telephone kiosks are often damaged by groups of inebriated pub-drinkers just after closing time on Saturday.

In this case the probability of all elements is fairly great:

offenders: especially inebriated pub-drinkers.

objects: telephone kiosks^{xx)}.

locations: especially dark, remote places.

time: in many cases just after pub-closing time.

The probability of the elements provides a number of possibilities of prevention. For instance: improving lighting around often damaged phone kiosks. Another possibility is to patrol around pub-closing time. In the case of other phone kiosks the probability of location and time may be low, conceivably giving ground for technical measures, such as impact-resistant glass.

B. To what extent is it desirable or necessary to try to prevent an offence.

Deciding this desirability or necessity and accepting its consequences is a matter of policy, which is vested in the authorities. The following points, however, may be of importance in policy planning.

x) Both prevention and repression can be spoken of here: one category of people will not drink or not drive in view of possible checks; the category who do drive after drinking run the risk of punishment.

xx) The "victim" is replaced in this case by the "objects".

In the first place, the seriousness of the offence can be taken into account. It is important to distinguish between the seriousness of a given type of offence itself and the seriousness of the overall material damage these offences involve.

Bank hold-ups, for instance, are in themselves serious offences. Yet the material damage in its totality is less than the damage caused by theft of bicycles.

Bicycle thefts themselves are less serious, but many people are faced with their bicycles having been stolen. In view of this, prevention may put more emphasis on bicycle thefts without disregarding bank hold-ups. Perhaps prevention of thefts may ultimately have greater social results than security measures for banks.

All this is, of course, related to the basic notion that prevention does not take place in a social vacuum and to the objective that prevention should limit the material and non-material damage. In assessing the seriousness of offences, therefore, it is logical to take non-material damage into account despite the problems attaching to its determination.

In the second place it can be considered paying special attention to preventing offences committed mainly by juveniles. If, in a number of cases, offences committed by juveniles are the first step in a career of crime, prevention might also have a favourable longer term effect.

Lastly, the extent and trend of certain offences may play a part in deciding the advisability of taking measures. Priority might be given to offences showing a proportionately high increase, or offences the ratio of which between numbers known to the police and actual numbers is changing and the dark number is becoming greater. Or the extent to which certain offences are (or can be) successfully repressed might be watched.

To sum up, it can be said that in deciding what offences should qualify for prevention, considerations such as probability, seriousness, offenders' ages, and extent and trend of the offence may play a major role.

Following this, the importance of geographical distribution of an offence may be pointed out. If an offence qualifying for prevention occurs in a serious form in many places, it is practically certain that preventive measures against the particular offence will be taken in a number of these places. Especially in such cases it is useful to exchange experience, providing an accumulation of knowledge about this type of offence. As will be shown in Sections 3,4 and 5, this involves an important task for the national and regional Crime Prevention bureaus.

Although the exchange of experience is useful, measures successful in one place often cannot automatically be taken in another.

For instance in a place where the power company is prepared to make immediate repairs the number of cases of damage to lamp standards may be greatly reduced, whereas in another place where the power company cannot cooperate other measures will have to be sought for. It is also possible that quick repair helps in one place and not in another, for instance because the groups of offenders differ greatly in these two places.

Only if the specific situation related to a given type of offence shows close similarities in two places can transplantation of the measures be considered.

This does of course require that the specific situation in both places is properly analysed to bring the similarities to light. A model for such analyses, in which the offence elements again play a role, is discussed in Section 2 and elaborated in Annex 1.

SECTION 2: A MODEL

2.1. A basic view of Crime Prevention: the socially integrated approach

There are lots of things to inconvenience people!

People may be inconvenienced by traffic noise, air pollution, accidents; housing shortages, queues, fire, unemployment and a thousand and one other things.

This paper is concerned only with one way in which people may also be troubled or inconvenienced: by criminal offences.

Limitation to offences must not, however, lead to people being hypnotised by these offences; to the public, offences always remain one of the many aspects of society that may inconvenience them. They will thus always weigh this inconvenience - consciously or unconsciously - against the inconvenience they experience from other things.

Someone living for instance in a damp, stuffy basement may leave a window open when he goes shopping because his home will in any case smell a bit fresher when he returns. But leaving a window open increases the risk of persons entering, and anyone whose profession is crime prevention will concentrate on the possibilities of entry this gives rise to.

On the one hand there is indeed a risk of the person not - or not sufficiently - having allowed for the possibilities of entry he himself has created. Information and assistance may then prevent offences.

On the other hand, the basement tenant may have consciously weighed the pros and cons. He may be fully aware of the risks the open window creates, but prefers to take them rather than have a stuffy atmosphere in his home. Crime prevention in this event will have to have a totally different purport.

The hypothesis that criminal offences are only one of the many aspects of society inconveniencing the public is at first sight an "open door" (to use the same terminology). But the implications of this hypothesis are far reaching when one starts working on crime prevention: they limit the possibilities of prevention. In other words, prevention has its limits.

In general terms, one could say that the limits are at the point where the advantages of prevention for the public no longer outweigh the disadvantages.

For the basement dweller in the above example, this point was reached when it is assumed for completeness that "intermediate solutions" (e.g. barred windows, a fan, an alarm installation) were included by the basement dweller in his comparison, but that he did not want to or could not make use of such solutions (for instance because he did not want bars because they spoiled the view, or because a fan and/or an alarm installation was too expensive).

Such a choice is of course subjective: perhaps an outsider would not think it smelled stuffy at all in the basement; perhaps bars would not spoil the view at all; perhaps a fan is not too expensive...., but what other people think is not so important. It is the basement dweller who has to make the choice. He makes his comparison based on his own ideas, feelings and information. In other words: from his own preferences or options.

The fact that crime prevention is a field bounded by certain limits seems to make things clearer in the first instance, but on closer examination much of this clarity quickly evaporates because the limits differ from case to case and from person to person.

It is of primary importance for these differences to be borne in mind in crime prevention, because prevention must in fact be borne - and often effected - by the members of society and its organisations. Hence prevention can rarely be imposed from above! This means that crime prevention necessitates a socially integrated approach. Consequently, prevention must take into account the "unique" nature of every case (every situation).^{x)}

x) At first sight this viewpoint may have one major drawback; if prevention is always focused on the unique and individual nature of every single case no idea will be obtained of the relationships between these various cases. In other words, the structure will not be seen. This somewhat resembles the example of a group of plumbers all working at different points to plug a burst point in a water main and then dashing off to the next leak without seeing that there is something structurally wrong with the entire water mains system. This drawback can be eliminated however - proper evaluation of each individual job one plumber (crime prevention officer) has done; - proper liaison (coordination) between the plumbers. These two (interrelated) points will be reverted to (the importance of evaluation) in 2.3.; for coordination see Sections 4 and 5).

This calls for a special approach to preventive work however. This special procedure might be described as a purposeful and model-wise approach concentrated on creating a logical structure in the available choices.

2.2. General description of a model approach to crime prevention

It is very difficult to give general laws and rules on how to define the substance of preventive work: as already stated, the approach will have to be different from case to case.

For example, one approach to bicycle thefts applied very successfully in Groningen may be completely abortive in Maastricht. But if it is known that the problems of bicycle thefts in the two cities are almost similar, the prospects of the "Groningen approach" succeeding in Maastricht will be much greater.

Whether the problems are the same or not depends on the four elements into which it was possible to divide the concept of an offence (See also page 10):

- offender
- location
- victim
- time.

These four concepts form the axis around which prevention work turns as it were. When a certain offence is committed, there is a combination of these four concepts. In other words, a series of relationships exists between these concepts, and this specific combination of relationships emerges as a particular offence. In order to obtain greater clarity, therefore, it is first of all necessary to try to get to grips with the relationships forming the basis of the particular offence. In prevention jargon this is called "digging back into the problem".

The relationships that may arise between the four concepts can be clarified with a matrix.

Offender	Location	Victim	Time
Offender			
Location			
Victim			
Time			

Each compartment in the matrix can contain one or more relationships existing between the various concepts.

The precise way of using this matrix is clarified in Annex 1.

The matrix must be looked upon as a starting point: depending on the case in hand, the matrix is filled in with relationships and the four basic concepts are put in a more concrete form and their number increased if necessary. Hence, the matrix will be different for each case and justice will be done to its unique nature. At the same time, however, relationships of wider importance will be disclosed.

Approaching crime prevention with this matrix in other words provides a lever for determining case by case what relationships play a part in the process leading to a given offence.

Only when an idea has been obtained of the relationships influencing this process can a proper choice be made of the many relationships to which one wishes to attach the greatest importance in a given case. In other words, the choice is made to tackle certain relationships, but it is clearly seen what other relationships are (necessarily) left aside.

After this it can be established whether - and if so how - the selected relationships can or may be influenced. One determines in other words the objectives within the existing peripheral conditions.

On the basis of these objectives, it is then possible to select the measures it is intended to employ in order to influence the relationships leading to a given offence. A choice of very many measures is then possible. Some alternatives are grouped in Table 2 (page 16).

The follow-up to these measures is an evaluation to seek what went well and what went wrong in dealing with a project.

This objective and model-wise approach leads to a deliberate limitation in which one knows that choices are made and what these choices are.

This leaves an open mind for other relationships which cannot or may not be influenced.

This automatically leads, so to speak, to what has been discussed above as the "socially integrated approach".

An at least important advantage of this procedure is that the entire approach to a given problem is visualised and made verifiable.

This makes for easier comparability of - prima facie totally different - projects taking place throughout the country. It will then undoubtedly be found that there are many points of similarity between these different projects. This kind of systematic comparison will enable better and wider knowledge and information to be collected step by step concerning the possible approach to crime prevention projects. The next section will go into this latter point in greater detail.

Table 2

Grouped survey of a number of potential measures that can be selected to achieve preventive effects. It is not claimed to be exhaustive.

(a) Group: Cause-directed prevention

- make situations simpler by eliminating decision-uncertainties among the public
- group approach to bigger units
- approach to schools, youth clubs, and so on
- family approach
- improvement of structural problems (drugs, unemployment)
- defensible space

(b) Group: Evasive prevention

- objects or persons removed from situations without changing situation

(c) Group: Protection of objects

- raising the offender's physical threshold
- raising the offender's psychological threshold
- raising the offender's rational threshold

(d) Group: Awareness

- publicity campaigns
- lectures
- organising exhibitions
- inserting advertisements
- employing the media
- self-protection campaigns

(e) Group: Making rules

- helping to draw up rules
- helping with standardisation

- (f) Group: Patrolling
 - setting up selective supervision
 - carrying out preventive patrolling
 - conspicuous or inconspicuous surveillance
 - (g) Group: Recording
 - encourage recording of valuable objects
 - (h) Group: Information
 - increase readiness to lay charges, speed and quality of these
 - (i) Group: Repression
 - increase detection/prosecution
 - step up action against receivers
-

This^{is} an initial, very general description of a model with which the Crime Prevention officer can start his work. Actually, this model indicates a mode of thought: a way to a systematic approach to the problems in this area and of which it must honestly be said that this approach is in fact taken from the way the police in various municipalities/districts have already been operating for many years.

The above description, however, is very concise and is couched in rather general terms. The reader wishing to go deeper into a concrete elaboration of this model will find this in Annex 1.

Summarised schematically, the following phases and steps can be distinguished in this elaboration of the model:

Table 3

Model for dealing with crime prevention.

Phase A: Setting up a project

- 1 Warnings
 - 1A Listening for warnings
 - 1B Looking for warnings
- 2 Research

- 3 Setting up a project with the aid of a matrix
- 4 Determining objectives
- 5 Determining peripheral conditions
- 6 The work plan

Phase B: Investigation

Phase C: Measures

- 1 Choice of measures
- 2 Implementing the selected measures

Phase D: Evaluation

For elaboration see Annex 1

2.3. A future perspective?

The model briefly outlined above and elaborated in Annex 1 may at first sight seem troublesome and complicated. Yet this is not so bad as it seems because in actual fact many police officials use this model in planning and implementing projects, though often unconsciously. Besides the principles on which the model is based (See 2.1. and 2.2.), the most specific point characterising this model is probably the step by step conscious planning and reflection on the work that is being done.

In fact one builds a project brick by brick, the next brick being laid only when the previous one is firmly cemented. But conscious planning and reflection on every step is not all. The principal items in the job are also briefly recorded: the matrix, the objectives, the list of peripheral conditions, the work plan, the main research findings, the selected measures (+ expected effects) and lastly evaluation. All these very brief notes together certainly do not provide a coherent, elaborate scientific report, but for each completed project an important source of information and expertise is built up bit by bit.

However varied this information may be, the items can always be compared because the basic structure in which every report is cast is the same. The model provides for this: it is very clear to see what situation was involved, what choices were made and what the outcome was.

This procedure enables knowledge of crime prevention to cumulate as it were.

While on the one hand the starting point continues to be projects that have to be adapted to the special circumstances characterising each case and each situation, on the other hand (some time later) it is possible to distil more general lines from the growing store of completed projects. This would appear to be an ideal combination especially for the still very recent and barely explored area of crime prevention.

But if this perspective is to be realised in practice, full attention will have to be paid to supplementing an organisation structure attuned to creating possibilities of cooperation and coordination of the various persons working on crime prevention.

This problem will be gone into further in the following sections.

SECTION 3: POLICE (CRIME PREVENTION) REGULATIONS

3.1. Introduction

At the end of the last section it was stated that a good organisation structure is indispensable in creating scope for cooperation and coordination.

This need is met by the Police (Crime Prevention) Regulations^{x)} (referred to as the PMV Regulations). These Regulations establish, inter alia, "who has duties and authority". But this simple formulation needs some elucidation. The following sub-section begins this by outlining the organisation structure in general terms.

Sections 4 and 5 should be regarded as notes to a number of fundamental aspects of this structure.

3.2. Organisation structure

In order to clarify the notion of the organisation structure, a distinction can be made between the policy implementation and planning sides^{xx)}.

Policy implementation

The previous section dealt fully with the work of local Crime Prevention officials. This work forms a major part of the policy implementation side. The other part of implementation is vested in the Regional Crime Prevention Bureau. The officials working at these bureaus have a coordinating task for the local officials' activities. The PVM Regulations indicate the following duties and authorities:

x) The full text of the Police (Crime Prevention) Regulations is given in the annexes.

xx) This- not always clear - demarcation line is not made in the PVM Regulations themselves. The distinction is intended purely as an aid in clarifying the organisation structure.

Local level

Duty: to warn of, combat and prevent crime-promoting situations and behaviour, and to inform and encourage persons concerned regarding the action they should take to prevent or hinder offences and protect themselves against their direct consequences.

Regional level

(a) regional bureaus

- duties:
 - coordination of work at the local level in the region concerned
 - giving information and assistance at the local level
 - where necessary helping to carry out local duties
 - consultation with the local level
- authority:
 - to issue guidelines regarding duties at the local level.

Furthermore two provincial organisations carry out a number of duties at the regional level:

(b) the provincial police committee

- duties:
 - routine supervision of the work of the regional bureaus in the province concerned
 - planning work concerning the provincial monitoring organisation for police cooperation
 - coordinating the relevant activities with other police duties in the provincial context.

(c) provincial monitoring organisation for police cooperation

- duties
 - translating national policy into terms of regional policy
 - evaluating policy implementation
 - consultation on manning and accommodation of regional bureaus in the province.

Policy planning

The policy-planning work must be carried out by two advisory bodies - the Central Crime Prevention Committee and the National Crime Prevention Contact Committee - and also by the National Crime Prevention Coordinator^{x)}.

The two committees make recommendations to the Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs on crime-prevention policy. The precise definition of the terms of reference of both committees is to be found in annexes 3 and 4.

The National Coordinator translates the results of policy planning in the form of guidelines - which, as will be shown, must be regarded as recommendations - for policy implementation.

Conversely, experience gained by the executive bodies via the National Coordinator are brought to the notice of the two Committees.

This produces an interchange between policy and its implementation.

In actual fact, therefore, the National Coordinator has no strict policy implementation duties but constitutes the link between policy planning and policy implementation.

The PMV Regulations give the following duties and authorities for this:

the National Coordinator and his Bureau

- duties
 - to synchronise the regional coordinators' activities
 - to collect documentation, provide exhibition material
 - to prepare and provide publicity material
 - to provide information for and liase with the regional bureaus
 - to prepare and implement a policy programme
 - to conduct campaigns via the publicity media
 - to carry out technical and scientific research
 - to provide appropriate training
 - to organise and participate in consultation at the national level.

x) Here and in general in this paper further references are to the National Coordinator. The National Coordinator, his deputy and the officials assisting them together constitute the National Crime Prevention Bureau.

- authorities:
 - to issue guidelines
 - to chair the national meetings of the heads of regional bureaus.

SECTION 4: GENERAL FEATURES OF COORDINATION:
SUPPORT AND SYNCHRONISATION

4.1. Introduction

The organisation structure described in the previous section obviously influences relationships in the Dutch police and the relationship between the police and the authorities.

In the first place, the police forces and districts get more scope for cooperating in crime prevention.

Sub-section 4.2. devotes attention to the purport and implications of this cooperation.

Besides this, it is important to indicate how the coordinators have to take the above-mentioned relationships into account.

This will be done in sub-sections 4.3. and 4.4.

4.2. Coordination and cooperation

When police forces and districts cooperate on Crime Prevention this is not an encroachment upon their independence.

This means that the force leaderships themselves decide within the policy context whether there is to be cooperation or not in specific work on crime prevention. If cooperation is chosen, however, it must be accepted that compromises will be made where necessary with the other participants.

In the past, as stated in Section 1, the wish to cooperate on crime prevention was expressed.

This desire arose from two needs:

- In the first place there were limited possibilities in each force and district for individual (further) development of procedures and means usable for prevention.

A need for support thus arose. As was shown in Section 3, the National Coordinator's terms of reference are to meet this need by undertaking or providing research, training, aids and documentation.

- In the second place it was recognised that the prevention of some offences could generally be worked on more effectively if the preventive activities of various forces and districts were synchronised.

This need for synchronisation can be illustrated with a couple of examples:

a publicity campaign against pickpockets in Amsterdam public transport may make the public more careful, thereby reducing the number of victims. But there is a big risk of the pickpockets trying to transfer their activities to other cities in the Western conurbation. If an identical campaign is carried out at the same time in these other cities, this side-effect can be reduced.

In this example, therefore, synchronisation means the simultaneous undertaking of an operation in various police forces.

In addition, synchronisation may imply a form of representation. For instance, making arrangements with the provincial housing department concerning locks and fittings in subsidised houses. In such cases it is practical if the police forces and districts concerned are represented by a small delegation. The autonomous status of the cooperating forces and districts will then have to be kept in mind: the negotiations can only make arrangements with a mandate from those concerned.

4.3. How do coordinators coordinate?

Primarily, of course, the coordinators' work must not encroach upon powers of existing authority and control over the police.

This has important implications for the interpretation of the authority embodied in the PIV Regulations for the issue of guidelines by the National Coordinator and the Regional Coordinators.

The departmental directions on this point mean that guidelines must be treated as recommendations, or the giving of advice whether requested or unrequested. In other words: the coordinators are responsible for ensuring that synchronisation takes place. The responsibility for the work that is synchronised is vested in the authorities.

At least two conditions attach to proper functioning of this coordination without command powers:

- In the first place the authorities and the police force and district leaderships must be informed continuously and candidly about the purport of support and synchronisation.
- In the second place there must be mutual scope for communication between police chiefs and coordinating officials. Any differences in viewpoints about synchronisation can in any case then be discussed.

The way this exchange of information and communication is to take place will be worked out by closer consultation.

Besides compliance with the above-mentioned conditions, the "hazards" attaching to coordination will have to be taken into account.

In practice, coordinators will be faced with situations which, as it were, invite "a command approach".

- For example, a local Crime Prevention official with different views from one of his chiefs may ask the coordinator "what he thinks about it".

If the coordinator responds, the impression may be created in the chain of command in that force or district that "the coordinator has said it has to be done in such and such a way".

Caution on the coordinator's part in making recommendations and expressing opinions is not usually sufficient to avoid this effect. At the same time, Crime Prevention officials must be informed by the command structure that their chief's approval is required for decisions beyond their authority.

- The "chain of command problem" may have a different origin too. For instance, a decision may be made about crime prevention work by the command of a force or district. Suppose this decision does not reach its own crime prevention official in time. It may then happen that the national or regional coordinator who does know about it makes the decision known to the Crime Prevention official. This may give rise to misunderstandings. All concerned must of course try to avoid such problems as much as possible.

It has been made clear above how the coordinators must allow for existing authority and control powers. Nevertheless, support and synchronisation can certainly influence local police strategy. Support and synchronisation are not neutral and may influence the way police capacity is employed.

For instance, the amount of time the police spend on vandalism will depend very much on the approach chosen towards prevention.

The coordinators understand the possible approaches - such as strengthening objects, intensifying patrols, giving information at parent-teacher evenings, and so on. The authorities, however, decide whether a given approach does or does not fit in with local police policy.

4.4. The authorities

It was stated above that coordination cannot and must not involve any encroachment upon existing powers of authority and control over the police. The implications of this statement are elaborated in Section 5 with regard to the coordinating organisation.

Besides this, it is a good thing to allow for the influence coordination may have on police policy as conducted locally by the burgomaster and public prosecutor. Support and synchronisation are not neutral towards policy and have their effects on the way police capacity is employed. Police dealings with a subject such as vandalism, for instance, will be totally different when the emphasis is put on "information", "security" or "surveillance". The coordinators can provide all these kinds of emphasis but synchronising the chosen emphasis with local police strategy - and this is the consequence of the principle that the authorities are responsible for what is done with the results of coordination - takes place elsewhere.

Since crime prevention is connected with both public order and with investigation and prosecution, this matter should in any case be the subject of consultation by the triangle consisting of the burgomaster, public prosecutor and police chief.

All this means that the relationships and flows of information and aids outlined in the following sections can only function in relation to and against the background of police-wise consultation by the local triangle. After synchronisation concerning the desired emphasis in the approach to the problem of offences and any priorities in this,

those taking part in the consultations, each retaining his own responsibility, can decide in greater detail the settings within which support and synchronisation by the Crime Prevention organisation is desired.

Without detracting from the duties of the Provincial Monitoring Organisation for Police Cooperation, as indicated in Sec. 5 of the FMV Regulations, the proposed procedure may also avoid a burgomaster or public prosecutor being confronted with local or regional strategies that have been arrived at without his participation.

In local, regional and national coordination there will have to be a constant awareness of the necessary gearing of implementation to policy as carried out by the local authority. National policy will also have to concentrate on furthering this gearing wherever possible.

SECTION 5: COORDINATION AT LOCAL, REGIONAL AND NATIONAL LEVELS


5.1. Functional connection between the three levels

Support and synchronisation require a continuous flow of information and aids between the three levels. From this viewpoint, therefore, a coordinating function should be regarded as the distribution or collection of information and aids.

Figure 1 shows how this can be presented schematically.^{x)}

Fig. 1

other force
members



Schematic diagram of the functional relations between the police-force members and their Crime Prevention official (AVM), the regional Crime Prevention officials (RBVM) and the national Crime Prevention Bureau (LBVM).

This diagram shows the functional connection between the various levels in a simple, general way.

The following three sub-sections will go into the coordinating functions belonging specifically to each level.

x) The lines in this model of course have no command-structure significance. They indicate the "channels" along which the information and aids "flow".

5.2. Coordination at the local level

The basic assumption of the Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs is that crime prevention is one facet in the range of duties of every police officer. Designation of an officer in a police force, district or service to take charge of crime prevention cannot therefore be regarded as discharging the other police officers from this aspect of their duties.

In fact the designation "local coordinator" or "contact man" used in various places (instead of "Crime Prevention official" thus fits in well with the coordination idea.

Since every police officer can undertake prevention activities it is desirable to make the Crime Prevention official's know-how and aids available locally as well. This support and synchronisation can increase the effectiveness of these operations.

All this can be regarded as a functional relationship intersecting the internal lines of command.

To make this clear it may be useful to present a police officer's overall range of duties as follows.

	Without making any claim to completeness, the
<u>O.C.</u>	following duty aspects can be mentioned:
<u>H.V.</u>	
<u>Investigation</u>	Maintenance of public order (O.C.); giving
<u>V.M.</u>	assistance (H.V.); investigating offences
	(Investigation) and crime prevention (V.M.).

These duty aspects will of course bear a different relationship to one another and be particularised differently for each police officer (for example according to traffic or juvenile cases). Coordination of the Crime Prevention aspect in the range of duties of a number of policemen is, as it were, a horizontal connection between these ranges of duties:

	<u>O.O.</u>			
	<u>H.V.</u>			
	<u>Invest-</u>			
	<u>igation</u>			
Coordination	V.M.	V.M.	V.M.	V.M.
Crime Prevention				

As stated, the above coordination is vested at the local level in the Crime Prevention official.

- In the first place because besides attending to synchronisation he can contribute his own activities to support others' individual activities.

- Owing to his involvement with regional Crime Prevention events he can also bring about a link-up between local and regional Crime Prevention synchronisation.

- Lastly, he can make available the internal information usable for that purpose (for instance from other Crime Prevention officials)^{x)}.


Nor must a Crime Prevention official's coordinating duties encroach upon the existing lines in a police force or district. Clear arrangements will have to be made as to how the Crime Prevention official informs the "bosses" of the colleagues being coordinated and how he can communicate with them. Regular consultation at various levels - to supplement the written information provided more often if possible - would seem indispensable.

The relationship between the Crime Prevention official, his colleagues and the police force command structure can be depicted as follows:

x) These three items indicate solely the Crime Prevention official's coordinating duties. This is only part of his overall range of duties (See Section 3). Item 3 in particular also emerged in Section 2.

Fig. 2

Model of the relationships between the local/district Crime Prevention official, his colleagues and the senior staff and leadership of a police force or district.



The purpose of the local coordination outlined - it cannot be emphasised enough - is to increase the effectiveness of the preventive work every police official does.

5.3. Regional coordination

The effect of coordination at the regional level can be compared with that at local level. But the coordination is attended to by regional officers attached for control purposes to the centre-forces/districts, while those coordinated are not local colleagues but regional Crime Prevention officials.

In the relationship between a regional coordinator and the Crime Prevention officials in this region there are no command powers, but only recommendations (as in the relationship between the Crime Prevention official and his colleagues in the police force or district). The recommendations can only be turned into directions after decision by the competent authorities.

The regional coordinator can hardly check whether every wish that reaches him is "covered" by the Crime Prevention official's "chiefs". He must assume this to be so. A potential instrument for providing information might be reports of working meetings. For example:

- the report of the regional meetings for police chiefs in the region.

- the reports of the national meetings of regional coordinators for the Provincial Police Committees.

As a final item, it should be pointed out that the Provincial Police Committees and the Provincial Monitoring Organisations for Police Cooperation (See also Section 3) follow and monitor the work of the regional coordinators^{x)}.


As communication with the police chiefs is not always direct but also takes place via the above-mentioned provincial bodies, the gap between a regional coordinator and the force and district leaderships is rather wider than that between a Crime Prevention official and his force or district leadership.

x) Here, too, there is in fact no question of a command relationship as is the case in the relationship between Crime Prevention official and police-force or district leadership.

Relationships at the regional level can be represented as follows:

Fig. 3

Model of the functional relationships in regional coordination.



The relationships are shown in this figure as:

information and communication	supervision
directions	recommendations

5.4. National coordination

With several additions the coordination model already used can be applied at the national level.

At this level, coordination is the duty of officials of the departments of Justice and Home Affairs accountable to both Ministers together. The Ministers are advised by the Central Crime Prevention Committee and the National Crime Prevention Contact Committee.

Similarly to regional coordination, national coordination derives its purpose and legitimacy from the views existing in the various forces and districts, based on policy as laid down by the competent local authorities.

It will often be necessary to have further consultation with the force and district leaderships in order to obtain their consent. Such consultation will not usually be direct but will be step-wise via the regional coordinators.

To make this feasible the national coordinator must be able to assume that a viewpoint or standpoint brought to his notice by a regional coordinator is supported by the forces and districts within the region concerned.

Schematically, national coordination is as follows:

Fig. 4

Model of functional relationships in National Coordination.

Ministry of Justice	National Crime Prevention Contact Committee
Ministry of Home Affairs	Central Crime Prevention Committee

Provincial bodies

individual police chiefs

LBVM	RBVM	RBVM	RBVM	RBVM
	1	2	3	22

directions

communication and
information

recommendations

LBVM = National Crime Prevention Bureau

RBVM = Regional Crime Prevention Bureau

In the further extension of the entire organisation, attention must be paid to the way information and communication are to be achieved between the provincial bodies and both the Central Committee and the National Contact Committee and also the national Coordinator.

In conclusion it may be said that in local, regional and national coordination there must be a constant awareness of the need for a link-up between operations and policy as carried out by the local authorities. National policy will also have to aim at encouraging this link-up wherever possible.

ANNEX 1

Elaboration of a model for dealing with crime prevention

Page

Introduction

PHASE A: Planning a project

1. Warning signals
 - 1 (a) Hearing the warnings
 - 1 (b) Looking for warnings
2. Fact-finding
3. Planning a project with the aid of a matrix
4. Determining objectives
5. Determining the peripheral conditions
6. The work plan

PHASE B: Research

PHASE C: Measures

1. Selecting measures
2. Implementing the measures

PHASE D: Evaluation

Introduction

The model elaborated in this annex describes what steps must at least be taken in a crime prevention campaign.

Such campaigns (referred to in the following as prevention projects) are conducted by Crime Prevention officials throughout the country; sometimes they are individual, sometimes in a wider context.

This annex does not go into internal coordination or organisation for the Crime Prevention organisation as a whole (for this see Sections 4 and 5).

The model below describes, in other words and in general terms, the approach to a crime prevention project.

PHASE A: PLANNING A PROJECT

1. Warning signals

(a) Hearing the warnings:

A project does not start off automatically. There must be some reason for starting to think "we ought to do something about that sometime". This reason occurs when warnings are heard from various sources that "there is something the matter" and "something must be done about that".

The warnings may come from quite different sources: from the public, the media, associations and/or organisations, or from administrative or police circles.

In itself this is at first sight a fairly uncomplicated starting point for a project: a bell rings, and the bell relates to a specific problem; and a project is started up to deal with this problem. Unfortunately, things are not so simple in practice: the Crime Prevention official's office is full of bells and they are almost constantly all ringing at once! Some loud, some soft, and the one that rings loudest is not by definition connected with the biggest problems. To make matters more complicated still, the Crime Prevention

official - like everyone else - also listens selectively: he hears some bells (interesting, amusing or dangerous ones) better than others.

Such problems are extremely difficult to get around.

- First of all, a choice will have to be made: some problems can be dealt with, while others will have to be put aside (perhaps temporarily). Though it should be indicated every time why this particular problem is chosen in preference to the many others. In other words, this is a question of the relevance of a given project.

- Secondly, an effort will have to be made to make the fullest possible use of more general knowledge and information that exists, for instance, in the form of research and statistical material^{x)}.

Utilisation of this more general knowledge and information is extremely useful because it will help to avoid too incidental an approach: a sensation-seeking journalist or panicking members of the public may sometimes pull the bell very hard while in actual fact only unimportant or incidental problems are involved. If a project had to be launched for every Wild Indian story, the important work would undoubtedly be left aside.

(b) Looking for warnings

But warnings need not be awaited passively and calmly: one can always try to anticipate the tinkling of the bell!

There are two reasons why it is important to try actively to track down some warnings in a very early stage: firstly because a problem is usually easier to tackle in an early stage, but also because the inconvenience people suffer from offences is largely subjective.

x) For support with general knowledge and information an important part can be played by the National Crime Prevention Bureau. Knowledge and information will have to be passed on by the National Bureau to the regional and local levels.

For instance, if at a given moment warnings about street robberies become very strong (overdone accounts, exaggerated reporting and so on) there is a disproportionate increase in the emotional inconvenience suffered by the public.

If (!) one can take action before the warnings sound really loudly, a double effect is achieved: the offence in question is dealt with and (partly because of this) the inconvenience caused by increased feelings of insecurity, for instance, occurs less quickly.

Of course it is no easy matter to look for warnings that are not clearly sounded. How can we look for something that is (hardly) there as yet? And while the overall police workload is already greater than can be coped with?

- Firstly, in this difficult task use can again be made of research and statistical material: an increase in the number of times a given offence is committed often precedes the actual sounding of warnings from the public and in the media.

- Secondly, an offence (or an increase in the number of offences) will not occur at the same time everywhere in the Netherlands (or in the world). Big cities in particular are often in the forefront. This is a fact that can be taken into account. If it is observed that there is hardly any school vandalism (yet) in a given village and if it is known at the same time that school vandalism in New York has already become a scourge and that it is beginning to emerge strongly all at once in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, the village can already start considering action in view of the odd few cases that are occurring there.

- Thirdly, the occurrence of an offence (or an increase in the number) is noted earlier by some people. For instance, an increase in the number of bicycle thefts will first be noted by insurance companies and cycle-shed proprietors, and afterwards by frequent cyclists and only after then by racing cyclists.

The same applies to damage done to lamp standards and so on. It will first be noted by the repair workers, then by the municipal public works departments and only after this by the public.

Frequent, close contact with the various sections of the community is therefore very important for Crime Prevention work and ample time will have to be allowed for it.

The three sources mentioned above can be used for tracking down warning signals in the early stages. If they are used in combination, the effect will obviously be augmented.

Arising from warning signals that have been heard or found, a decision will be made at a given moment "to go a little further into this".

This choice will always depend partly on the crime prevention official concerned. This cannot be entirely avoided, even in view of what was said about this in the foregoing. It is therefore very important for the person who makes this choice to try to indicate as precisely as possible what he thinks the importance (relevance) of the project is and what warning signals have given rise to the decision to launch a project. Without this, the question whether the choice fits in with policy remains difficult to answer.

2. Fact-finding

After the choice has been made to tackle a given problem, it is important to have an overall idea of the substance of the problem. Where are the offences committed or where would they be committed? How many offences are involved and how serious are they? Who is involved (or might be involved)? And so on and so forth.

It will be seen that these are very broad questions which only call for broad answers.

The special importance of this step is the fact that it provides some initial impressions and establishes some contact. This gives a rather better picture, and on this basis it can always be decided whether or not to carry on with the project; after all it may be

decided not to deal with the problem. For instance because a problem-- is not suitable for prevention (cf. sub-section 1.3.).

It is better and more efficient to find this out at an early stage and to go back to the starting point, thereby saving a lot of useless work!

3. Planning a project with the aid of a matrix

If the outcome of the initial fact-finding is a decision to start work, then project planning really begins.

On the basis of the still vague information now available, the first thing is to put more structure into the project to be planned.

Providing this structure is greatly simplified by using a matrix as given in an embryonic form in 2.2. The matrix introduced there was formed from four general basic concepts (i.e.: offender, victim, location and time).

These four concepts will however have to be adjusted from time to time to the concrete case that is going to be dealt with. It is possible for example, to arrive at the following four concepts for a project aimed at bicycle-theft prevention:

- offenders (= characteristics, including accessibility, modus operandi, etc.)
- around school playgrounds (= location)
- children whose bicycles are stolen (= victims)
- during school hours (= time)

Many other possibilities are equally conceivable and the four general basic concepts should not be applied too slavishly:

- for example extra concepts can be added which are of major importance to the case concerned. It may sometimes be useful, for instance, to include the concepts of "police", "the courts", "municipal services". Basically, the number of additional possibilities is unlimited! But if the matrix is to remain at all manageable it is important for practical reasons not to select more than five or six concepts.

- Besides this, concepts can be omitted. For instance, "location" and "time" are often not included separately because they are abundantly clear and/or unchangeable in the case in question.

- Lastly, concepts can be included in a somewhat different form. For instance in the case of a vandalism prevention project word "damaged objects" can be included instead of "victims", because the damaged objects are in fact the most direct and concrete "victims" of vandalism.

It will thus be seen that there is plenty of "scope" from case to case in selecting the concepts from which a matrix must be formed. One must indeed make creative use of the available information and distil from it a number of concepts within which the entire problem to be dealt with can be comprised. Moreover, it must be clear what the precise substance is of the chosen concepts. In other words, the concepts must have a clear-cut definition.^{x)}

Once such a series of concepts has been established, they are put on paper in matrix form. This delineates the project area. But delineation is not enough: the matrix compartments are still empty. Relationships can be entered in every compartment which are between the two concepts belonging to that compartment.

A relationship may be a question that arises when a given compartment is considered, or an item of information about a connection between two concepts.

As an illustration a possible completion of part of a matrix.^{xx)}

x) For instance so that an outsider can understand what the concept means.

xx) This is only part of a matrix. The situation and offence this matrix relates to has been purposely left obscure.

A completed matrix relating to a vandalism project in Stierburg can be found in the brochure of the National Crime Prevention Bureau: Vandalism "Know something about vandalism and what can be done about it" (1981).

Table 4

Part of a provisional matrix for planning a Crime Prevention project.

	OFFENDERS	VICTIMS	POLICE
<u>Offenders</u>	Information: The offenders operate in groups. Questions: How many people are in the groups? Are they gangs or varying groups? What is their modus operandi? How might they be approached?	Questions: Do the offenders know their victims? Do they perhaps choose certain types of victims?	Information: The police have never filed complaints against the offenders.
<u>Victims</u>	Question: Do some victims perhaps know the offenders?	Questions: How many victims were there in the past year? Can this be estimated? How?	Information: Hardly any victims lay charges with the police. Last year five did so.
<u>Police</u>	Questions: Do the police have suspicions and/or evidence of who the offenders might be? If so, who?	Questions: Are some victims scared (not prepared) to lay charges? If so, why?	Information: The police have no extra manpower available for this project. Assistance in the form of patrol

In this way all the matrix compartments can be gone through and filled in with questions and information.

Notwithstanding the fact that in that event every relationship occurs twice (for instance victims-offenders AND offenders-victims) an attempt must be made to complete all the compartments. A relationship is not necessarily always reciprocal. This can be seen from the above example: if the offenders know their victims the reverse does not necessarily apply.

If only half the compartments are completed, this might mean that extremely useful questions and information are forgotten in the matrix (in other words not made explicit).

It may indeed be possible that some compartments - even after long reflection - are left quite empty. In that event there are obviously no clear relationships between these two concepts.

After the matrix has been filled in in this way with all possible questions and information^{x)}, matters can be rearranged more neatly at the end of this step: questions and information that are duplicated can be deleted. Relationships that are too vague or unclear can also be deleted (or elaborated).

This then completes the entire matrix and indicates the structure of the problem. This structure is now clear to everyone, it is accessible and also very briefly summarised in a single diagram. But after this it will have to be decided what is to be done with the problem: what objectives does one want to aim at.

x) It is indeed advisable to include all possible questions and information in the matrix. Even data that are abundantly obvious and seem commonly known may be important. It is better to put too much in the compartments at first and delete it later than to "forget" to include a lot of data at the beginning.

4. Determining objectives

The completed matrix in fact provides a map of the problem area that is to be concentrated on.

But a map is useless without knowing whether one has to turn left or right at the next intersection. This choice depends on where one wants to go: an objective is needed.

The ultimate objective of every prevention campaign follows directly from the observations in sub-section 2.1.: reduction of the inconvenience people suffer through offences.

However vague and general this ultimate objective may be, it is very important to bear it in mind in every prevention campaign, and everyone does this in fact.

If they did not, a simple solution might be sought for the offence of car theft: all cars could be banned and car thefts would automatically be a thing of the past.

Or - in order to get rid of burglary - people could live in strong-rooms built of reinforced concrete several metres thick. Fortunately, the drawbacks of these very stringent solutions are taken into account and the ultimate objective is in fact thereby borne in mind: to reduce inconvenience to the public; but this must not happen at the expense of much greater inconvenience in other respects.

This ultimate objective will, however, have to be put in more concrete terms of preventing offences.

The objectives adapted specifically to this field have already been referred to in 1.3.:

- The relative and absolute reduction of the risk of offences being committed.
- The relative and absolute reduction of the material and non-material damage caused by offences.

But these objectives, too, are still too general to be used for planning a given prevention campaign. A series of more concrete objectives will have to be arrived at^{xx)}.

These objectives must of course fit into the structure plotted via the matrix. If the subject is bicycle thefts near schools, for instance, concrete objectives will have to be determined relating to the concepts of importance to this problem. The objectives that are formulated will, in other words, have to be connected directly with the relationships in the matrix compartments or with the concepts of which the matrix consists.

To glance again at the specimen matrix on page 8, however, the Crime Prevention official concerned will firstly have to aim at reducing the number of relevant offences in this case.

Besides this, however, he may set many other objectives: he may, for instance, aim at relationships between police and victims (in other words: the police-victims compartments in the matrix) and aim at increasing the victims' readiness to lay charges (in the hope of tracing the offenders and reducing the public's feelings of anxiety).

The importance of the concrete objectives formulated in this way is two-fold.

- In the first place such objectives give a foothold during a project: one knows what one is aiming at and moreover it can be seen afterwards whether and, if so, to what extent the objectives have been attained.

- In the second place, after objectives have been clearly formulated, the problem in hand can be arranged in a more orderly fashion. Continuing the comparison between the matrix and a map, it might be said that objectives can reduce the size of the map: if one

xx) These are in fact sub-objectives. But the term objectives is used for convenience in this paper.

intends to cycle from Delfzijl to Middelburg, a map of the whole of the Netherlands is needed showing the possible cycle routes. All other maps are less important - compared with this cycling map of the Netherlands - and there is no need to take them along in the carrier bag. But if the objective is more limited (to cycle from Delfzijl to Groningen for example), most of the cycling map of the Netherlands is useless. All one needs is the top right-hand corner of this map and perhaps even a better map is obtainable of that corner alone.

Once objectives have been clearly formulated, it is known in other words what one is aiming at. The matrix can be adapted and adjusted by reference to this: useless baggage can be jettisoned! But not only objectives are valuable for this. Peripheral conditions may also be very important in this adaptation.

5. Determining the peripheral conditions

Routes one intends to traverse sometimes prove to be closed off. An effort must be made to allow for this before planning a prevention project in order to save much useless work and frustrations.

In this context these are sometimes referred to as peripheral conditions.

- Firstly, there are peripheral conditions of a political and ethical nature. For example, a minor investigation within a prevention project may be made partly impossible owing to privacy protection legislation, making certain personal data inaccessible.

Besides this for instance, preventive measures may sometimes remain unimplemented because they are not ethically justified: installing police cameras in obviously private accommodation, horrifying publicity about traffic accident in the context of road safety, and so on^{x)}.

x) These political and ethical peripheral conditions are in fact already embodied in the observations in 2.1. and in the ultimate objective of prevention mentioned earlier.

But there is another and much more practical series of peripheral conditions.

- Secondly, planning and implementing a prevention project always involves the peripheral conditions of time, money and manpower.

For example, there is rarely enough time to examine thoroughly all the questions involved in a specific problem. One will have to reconcile oneself to this, and the time (and also money and manpower) factors will have to be consciously allowed for: every project will have to be planned and phased according to time and resources (see also work plan item 6).

Besides the objectives, therefore, the peripheral conditions also produce more order in the problem it is intended to deal with. By reference to the list of peripheral conditions for a given project, the contents of the matrix can be limited. Questions in the matrix that cannot be answered within the time available or with the money and manpower available can be deleted.

Also, the objectives formulated earlier can be adapted: if a given objective is unattainable within the existing peripheral conditions, it will have to be dropped.^{x)}

To go back to the specimen matrix on page 8, it might prove impossible, for instance, with the time and money available, to solve the questions in the "victims-victims" compartment. For example because all the victims were foreigners who left the Netherlands again long ago. In that event there is no point in trying to answer the questions in the matrix, and they can be deleted.

In addition, the list of peripheral conditions can still be used at a later stage. Especially in implementing measures it will have to be ensured that they are chosen within the existing peripheral conditions:

x) A particular problem may, of course, be considered so serious that one will endeavour to influence the peripheral conditions themselves. If this succeeds, however, new peripheral conditions will emerge to take the place of the former ones.

measures that cost more time and money than is available are unusable for the time being.

It will be seen that in this way the objectives that have been formulated and the existing peripheral conditions have limited the original matrix.

Consequently, we now have a map measured to the problem in hand and to what is intended - and is attainable - with respect to that problem; this can be called a "finished matrix".

Now it is almost possible to start, but for a number of reasons it is wise to make a "plan de campagne" first.

6. The work plan

Drawing up a work plan is really nothing but listing the work already done as above and, by reference to this, plotting the work that has to be done to reach the final point of the project.

The work plan is important for three reasons:

- it gives a clear picture of what has to be done. The Crime Prevention official carrying out the project knows where he is up to and what he has to do.

- Besides this, however, the work plan enables others to understand what the project is about. The word 'others' refers not only to colleagues (including those in other police forces) but in fact anyone involved in the project in any way at all.

- Lastly, a clear work plan is one of the major pillars in evaluation at the end of every project. Evaluation is a subsequent assessment of what went well and what went wrong in a project. If it is no longer known at the end of a project what the precise plans were, it can never be seen what went well and what went wrong in implementing the plans.

In other words, evaluation is extremely difficult if not impossible without a good work plan.

But....what should a work plan look like?

- Firstly, it must contain a brief introduction to the problem the project is intended to deal with: what is the problem and why is it important to deal with it at this particular moment?

This introduction consists in fact of the work done in the very early project planning stages (1. Warnings and 2. Fact-finding).

- Secondly, it is useful to include the objectives in the work plan.

- Thirdly, there is a list of peripheral conditions and other practical points: how many people will be working on the project, how many working hours are available in total, for what period is the project planned, how much money can be spent, and so on.

- Fourthly, the finished matrix can be included. For this, it is important to define the concepts from which the matrix is built up.

Lastly, the tasks still ahead are reviewed with an indication of how much working time each task is roughly going to need.

At first sight, production of such a work plan may seem to involve a very great deal of work, but this is not as bad as may seem:

- In the first place because most of the work has already been done. Scissors and adhesive tape will probably do most of what is needed.

- Secondly, drawing up a work plan is nothing really special: if a journey through an unknown area has to be plotted, exactly the same is done. A good map is provided (the matrix), one or more objectives are decided on, the roads that are usable and possible and those that are not (peripheral conditions) are considered, and lastly, based on these matters, a route is plotted indicating, for instance, where something has to be or can be done along it (eating, drinking, refuelling, sight-seeing, etc.).

But such a route must not be looked upon as a rigid straitjacket. Diversions en route are quite possible and sometimes even essential (the usual toilet halts, for example).

The work plan (or the plotted route) ensures however that the effects of any such diversion from the plan can be assessed. Wenn a work plan has been made the project planning phase is completed. The next phase can now be started, with the support of the work plan.

PHASE B: RESEARCH

It will mostly prove necessary not to start too hastily with some preventive measures, because there is too much risk of failures since there is insufficient knowledge of the relationships within the problem. First of all, a definitive diagnosis will have to be made: research will be needed!

This word "research" does not refer to very elaborate scientific research covering many months. In the implementation of a prevention project it is much more a question of very concrete, short-term, small-scale investigations. But one thing is essential, even in this kind of research: one must know precisely what one wishes to learn. In other words, there must be explicit questions for which an answer can be sought.

Basically, these questions already exist in the matrix, and an effort will have to be made to answer them in the time available (see the planning in the work plan for this). There is a wide range of means available for this: books, newspapers, periodicals, statistics, interviews, telephone conversations, one's own observations, and so on.

In view of the almost inevitable lack of time plaguing a Crime Prevention official, it is better to try out simple means first: a (phone) conversation with someone who has read very many books on a given subject may be a little less reliable but certainly takes up a lot less time than going through all the books oneself.^{x)}

x) The importance may again be pointed out of proper coordination and organisation. A Crime Prevention official working on a project can obtain his information via the National Bureau and the Regional Bureaus. For instance about existing documentation he can use, and/or other projects (current or completed) relating to the same subject.

Besides this, simple opportunities for research must not be immediately rejected. In a problem such as cycle thefts from school playground X, a senior citizen living opposite the school may have a lot more to tell than the insurance company's director.

When the questions in the matrix have been answered - whatever the way - the research phase can be closed. Usually, in fact, it will be found that all the answers cannot be given by the time limit set by the work plan. Asking questions is always easier than answering them!

This is not such a problem, however, provided the most important questions have been answered first. In other words, a certain ranking must be made in the matrix questions.

The information from the research phase must not, of course, merely be noted, and simply followed by resumption of the work.

The information available forms the basis of the measures that are now going to be taken. Hence it is important first to have a good look at the research results. For this purpose the information, summarised in short sentences could be noted in the matrix.^{x)} This structurises the items of information better.

x) This may change the contents and form of the matrix. In this case there will be a new matrix improved by the influence of the research. The form of the matrix may change for instance because the research leads to the conclusion that the concepts that originally formed the matrix were incomplete, too wide or too limited. Consequently, a new matrix may be made with more (or fewer) concepts. The concepts in this new matrix also often have to be expressed more precisely as compared with the first matrix. But the contents of the matrix may change too: some questions have become answers, others may be replaced by more (and more precise) questions. The original matrix, in other words, develops in form and content during the entire course of a project. The matrix might be represented as a picture (a photograph) that is constantly changing. All the photographs in succession form a film as it were showing how the purport of the project develops.

Lastly, it can be added that the research may lead to a decision to abandon the project after all. For instance because the problem proves unsuitable for prevention on closer examination or because the problem is actually less serious than had been thought. Better to turn back half way than take the wrong route altogether!

PHASE C: MEASURES

This is the phase in which the prevention campaign proper is carried out: measures (or means) must now be chosen and implemented.

1. Selecting measures

The work done in the preceding phase (A. Planning and B. Research) forms the basis for the choice of measures intended to be carried out.

For each project the measures will thus differ for the simple reason that a different situation exists in each project (matrix) and/or different objectives have been formulated and/or there is a different list of peripheral conditions.

On the one hand these differences seem annoying at first sight because there is apparently no standard list of measures from which to choose.^{xx)}

On the other hand this is precisely the fundamental point at issue in this model: prevention will have to allow for the "unique" nature of every case (or every situation) (cf. Section 2). From this viewpoint a centralistic approach is fundamentally wrong. The model discussed in this annex will ensure that full account is taken of the unique character of the situation upon which one wishes to concentrate in a given project. At the same time the model "forces" a logical structure to be built into a project so that it can be evaluated and compared with other projects.

xx) In order to give a concrete idea of the possible measures that may be chosen, however, a series of measures was enumerated on page 16 (Table 2).

However much the measures selected from project to project differ, all measures chosen will have to satisfy three general conditions:

1. Implementation of any measure must make it possible to attain one or more of the formulated objectives and must not frustrate other objectives.

At first sight this condition may perhaps seem obvious. But this general condition has a sting in its tail. A given measure may be very useful for attaining one particular objective, but the selfsame measure may at the same time make another objective unattainable or very seriously frustrate it. For instance, suppose a Crime Prevention official dealing with a project aimed at the noise people cause to one another in a given neighbourhood sets two objectives:

- To ensure that the young moped riders who use the neighbourhood for "cross country" racing can make their noise in an open area outside town.

- To ensure that there is better understanding between the young people and residents about the inconvenience they cause one another.^{x)}

Suppose the Crime Prevention official next selects measures aimed particularly at:

- increasing the number of charges laid by the public about complaints of excessive noise.

- consequent quicker and more effective police action towards the youth.

- pointing out to the young people at the same time that there is an alternative area out of town.

This series of measures fits in logically with the first objection. But it seems very likely that these measures will in fact obstruct attainment of the second objective. In this case, therefore, either the second objective has been wrongly formulated or the wrong measures have been chosen for the objectives.

x) For argument's sake these objectives are put in very general terms. In reality, some words would probably have to be more accurately defined. For example: precisely which young people, which residents, what is meant by "understanding" and by "inconvenience"?

This inconsistency was very clear in this example. But matters are sometimes not so clear because the measures selected clash with the general objectives of prevention described in 1.2. and 2.1. In this case, one speaks of undesirable side-effects and this brings us to the second general condition which all selected measures must satisfy:

2. Implementation of a measure must not bring about undesirable side-effects, or must reduce them to a minimum.

This means that in choosing a particular measure, one must as it were try to predict what effects its implementation will have and whether these effects are really wanted (i.e. whether they fall within the formulated objectives).

There are three major categories of side-effects one must be on guard against:

- Firstly, attention is again (cf.1.2.) drawn to the fact that implementation of some preventive measures may involve non-material damage for some members of the public.

The main effect envisaged is the increase in feelings of unsafety. For instance a publicity campaign about muggings that is carried a little too far may lead to some categories of people (the elderly for instance) hardly daring to walk in the street any more. Similarly, an exaggerated campaign warning against "sexual offences against children" may frighten parents so badly that they no longer dare to let their children play in the street.

- Secondly, changes may be caused by specific preventive measures. In 1.2. the example was given of the car thieves who switched over to moped stealing. This transposes one offence into another. Other changes are possible too.

- Thirdly, some preventive measures may involve the risk of ready-made prescriptions. A campaign drawing the attention of the public to the fact that open kitchen windows create a wonderful opportunity for burglary may at the same time bring some ill-disposed people to quite new but quite nasty thoughts.....

It is often very difficult to meet the condition that the implementation of a measure must not cause any unwanted side-effects, because these are sometimes very difficult to predict. One consequence of this general condition, however, is that the potential desirable and undesirable effects should be indicated along with the choice of every measure.

Such a prediction for every measure chosen also facilitates evaluation: subsequent comparison of the prediction with actual effects gives a clearer idea of what went wrong and what went well and why.

3. The third general condition all chosen measures must satisfy is the simplest: the measures must be practicable within the given peripheral conditions.

Briefly, there must be enough time, money and manpower to carry out the measures and their implementation must have no drawbacks of a political or ethical nature.

Within these three general conditions, the measures are finally chosen, and care must of course be taken that they are supported by information from the matrix and research (Phase B). On the whole, that measure - or combination of measures - will be aimed at which is the most productive.

2. Implementing the measures

Implementation of the selected measures makes the work public for the first time. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that outsiders still look rather awry at prevention work: they do not realise how much has been done before a particular measure can be carried out.

But even in this stage, the Crime Prevention official's work is still done largely in the background. As the peripheral conditions of time, money and manpower are often very pressing, it is usually impossible for the Crime Prevention official to undertake much of the implementation work himself.

In fact this is not the intention, because in that case he would have to be working on strengthening lamp standards against vandalism and fitting locks and bolts against burglars. The Crime Prevention official's main duties in this phase are to coordinate, to encourage and inform the public, community organisations and/or other police officers involved in putting the measures into effect.

In view of this, it is important for the first two phases of a project (A. Planning and B. Research) to have been carried out thoroughly.

It is precisely the results of these phases that provide indispensable support for the work the Crime Prevention official has to do in this phase of carrying out the measures. If the clear knowledge now available had not been obtained via the matrix and research, the Crime Prevention official's information work would become very difficult. The same applies to coordinating and encouraging: this would also be very difficult to carry out without clear objectives, without a good idea of the peripheral conditions and without a work plan.

PHASE D: EVALUATION

After completion of a project, an overall evaluation must always be made.

Briefly, evaluation boils down to reviewing the completed project, and indicating what has been achieved and what went well and what went wrong in the course of the project.

Three points can be concentrated upon:

- Firstly it is examined whether the formulated objectives have been attained. The before-situation is compared with the after-situation. The difference is set out against the objectives.

Suppose, for example, that when a pickpocketing project started there were 100 complaints a week and afterwards only 20. If this is compared with the objective (halving the number of complaints) the objective has been more than attained.

But what is the conclusion from the fact that the number of complaints has fallen from 100 to 20? The number of offences may have been reduced,

but it may also be possible that the number of complaints has fallen while the offence is being committed as much as ever.

It would be going too far in this paper to examine this type of measurement problem, yet such problems cannot be detached from the objectives. The more clearly and concretely the objectives are formulated, the more simple evaluation will be. If, at first, the vague objective had been "to do something about preventing pickpocketing", or to reduce the number of "cases" of pickpocketing, the problems are put off and evaluation produces bigger problems still. It is better to take a little longer to formulate the objectives and indicate how attainment or non-attainment of an objective is to be measured. It will in any case be clear that objectives not indicating concretely exactly what has to be achieved are worth little in evaluation.

It might be as well to add that it is rarely possible to rejoice in 100% attainment of all objectives. When the chosen measures are being carried out many unexpected things usually arise and it is very rare to meet with no disappointments.

"Attainment" of the objectives must not therefore be looked upon like an examination that one can pass or fail. The evaluation is made in order to learn from what has happened and been done. This knowledge may then be useful next time (for others as well).

- Secondly, evaluation must not only be centred upon the formulated objectives but other effects that have occurred owing to the measures must be examined as well. These may sometimes be very unexpected and will not necessarily always be negative.

For instance, the introduction of compulsory crash-helmet wearing by moped riders (a preventive road safety measure) greatly reduced the number of moped thefts.

Such totally unexpected effects should at least be mentioned in an evaluation report because this knowledge may be useful to others.^{x)}

x) The risk of unexpected side-effects is in fact lessened by using a good plan.

- Thirdly, all the phases the project has passed through will have to be evaluated. Potential questions are: what went wrong organisationally, what jobs could not be done (why not), how was the time employed, and so on.

This part of the evaluation is easy to make by means of subsequent comments on the work plan. It can be extremely useful as a means of gaining more understanding of one's own problems and obstacles. After a few evaluations of various projects, the conclusion may be reached for instance that some jobs take a relatively large amount of time, or that organisationally the same types of things always go wrong.

Solutions can then be sought for these more practical and organisational problems which sometimes prove to be of a structural nature. This may also be of importance in building up and extending the as yet young Crime Prevention organisation in the Netherlands.

After evaluation, a project can then really be closed.

It is found to be helpful if the evaluation results are briefly recorded. Such notes often prove very useful later, and others can frequently make grateful use of the experience and results recorded in this way. A good evaluation is in fact one of the corner stones of preventive work. This point was discussed in 2.3.

MINISTRY OF JUSTICE

MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
Police Directorate
Crime Prevention Division
No. 1647 C 579

MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS
Departmental Division: D.G.-O.O.V.
Police Directorate
No. EA79/3899

THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE

AND

THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS

Whereas it is desirable with a view to preventing and combating crime to equip the police better for their duties of informing and encouraging the public with respect to taking measures to protect themselves against the direct consequences of offences, and to prevent or hinder the committing thereof;

Having regard to Sections 5, 11 and 30 of the Police Act, and the Basic Regulations on Regional Police Cooperation;

Having regard to the recommendations of the Queen's Commissioner, the Attorneys General, the Directors of Police in office and the National Monitoring Committee on Police Cooperation;

Having heard the Burgomasters concerned;

O R D E R:

Section 1

Every municipal police force and every land and water district of the National Police Force, the Aviation Division and the General Traffic Division of the National Police shall have, in pursuance of regulations to be made by us, one or more officials responsible for giving warning, combating and preventing crime-promoting situations and conduct, and for informing and encouraging those concerned with respect to the measures

they should take in order to prevent or hinder the committing of offences and to protect themselves against the direct consequences of such offences.

Section 2

1. In every region as referred to in Section 1 of the Basic Regulations on Regional Police Cooperation a regional crime prevention bureau is to be set up responsible for:
 - (a) coordinating the work of the officials mentioned in Section 1 hereof whose operational areas are located in the police region concerned;
 - (b) giving information and assistance to the said officials;
 - (c) helping to carry out the work referred to in Section 1 hereof if this is desirable in connection with the duties of the officials mentioned therein.
2. The regional bureaus shall be located with the forces and districts named in Column 2 of List A appertaining to the said Basic Regulations.
3. We shall give directions for the setting up of the bureaus referred to in the previous paragraph hereof and concerning the appointment requirements, establishment and ranks of the personnel allocated for this purpose, over and above the organisational establishment, to the centre forces concerned as far as regards the municipal police.

Section 3

1. One official shall be put in charge of day-to-day leadership at every regional crime prevention bureau by the controller of the force or district in which it is located, after consulting the Provincial Monitoring Organisation for Police Cooperation and after having heard the national crime prevention coordinator referred to in Section 6. This official shall also act as regional crime prevention coordinator.

2. The regional crime prevention coordinator is empowered to issue guidelines to the officials referred to in Section 1 in consultation with the police force chief or district commander, with respect to their duties and shall have regular consultations with them for this purpose.

Section 4

With respect to crime prevention by the police the provincial police committee shall be responsible for:

- (a) day-to-day supervision of the work of the regional crime prevention bureau or bureaus in the province;
- (b) planning the work of the provincial monitoring organisation on police cooperation;
- (c) coordinating the work of the regional crime prevention coordinator or coordinators in the province where this work is connected with other police work carried out in supralocal cooperation.

Section 5

The special duties of the Provincial Monitoring Organisation on police cooperation referred to in Section 3, para. 3, of the Basic Regulations on Regional Police Cooperation are, as regards crime prevention by the police:

- (a) translation of national crime prevention policy into terms of regional policy with due observance of local and regional circumstances;
- (b) evaluation of the effects of implementing policy and reporting thereon to us;
- (c) consulting with the controller of the force or district in which the regional crime prevention bureau is located regarding the bureau's manning and accommodation.

Section 6

1. With due observance of the relevant directions to be issued by us the Head of the Crime Prevention Division of the Ministry of Justice shall act as National Crime Prevention Coordinator.

This official is responsible as such for:

- (a) synchronising the regional coordinators' activities, for which purpose he may issue the necessary guidelines and acts as chairman of their national meeting;
- (b) accumulating documentary data from the Netherlands and abroad on the subject of crime prevention;
- (c) providing exhibition material and publicity aids;
- (d) liaison with and furnishing information to the regional crime prevention bureaus.

2. The Minister for Home Affairs in consultation with the Minister of Justice shall designate a policy official of his Ministry's Police Directorate as deputy National Crime Prevention Coordinator.

Section 7

In the performance of his duties the National Crime Prevention Coordinator shall consult closely with the policy officials concerned at the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs, especially with respect to:

- (a) planning and implementing a policy programme;
- (b) conducting or procuring the conducting of campaigns in the publicity media;
- (c) conducting or procuring the conducting of technical and scientific research;
- (d) providing or procuring training for officials employed on crime prevention;
- (e) organising and taking part in consultations at the national level with the object of better crime prevention.

Section 8

There is a Central Crime Prevention Committee consisting of representatives of the Ministries of Justice and Home Affairs and of the Public Prosecutions Department, the National Administration and the police, whose terms of reference will be to advise us regarding crime prevention policy.

Section 9

This order shall be cited as "Police (Crime Prevention) Regulations". It shall be published in the Government Gazette and in the General Police Journal and shall become operative one day after publication in the Government Gazette.

The Hague, 21 December 1979

THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE

The Hague, 21 December 1979

THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS

MINISTRY OF JUSTICE

MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
Police Directorate
Crime Prevention Division
No. 1648 C 579

MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS
Departmental Division: D.G.-O.O
Police Directorate
No. EA79/3900

THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE

AND

THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS

Having regard to Section 8 of the Police (Crime Prevention) Regulations,

ORDER:

- (a) That a Central Crime Prevention Committee be set up whose terms of reference are to advise them on:
- an annual programme of activities;
 - administrative and legislative measures which may help to prevent certain offences, or at least to make them difficult to commit;
 - forms of cooperation between the police, other official bodies, the business community and other persons concerned with crime prevention;
 - the performance of duties by the regional crime prevention bureaux;
 - research into the effects of the programmes of activities;
 - training and education of police officials employed on crime prevention;
 - measures concerning the police organisation with respect to crime prevention.

(b) That the following be appointed to this Committee:

chairman: R.H. Scholte Ubing, Head of the Division for Criminal Investigation Policy and Crime Prevention of the Police Directorate of the Ministry of Justice;

member and secretary: R. Meijer, member of the Crime Prevention Division of the Police Directorate at the Ministry of Justice;

members: M.C.Alblas, Head of the Personnel sub-division of the Police Directorate at the Ministry of Home Affairs;
C.P.M.Bevers, Burgomaster of Hengelo;
J. Booster, District Public Prosecutor;
P. van Brakel, Chief Inspector of municipal police, Head of police force, Hardenburg;
J.L. Brand, Superintendent of municipal police The Hague;
D.C.B.Burgers, Burgomaster of Rosmalen;
G.J.Feijbrief, Commandant of the Nijmegen District of the National Police Force;
N.H.E.van Helten, Head of the Organisation and Equipment division of the Police Directorate at the Ministry of Home Affairs;
D. de Jong, Head of the Judicial Service Supervision department of the National Police General Inspectorate;
J. Riemersma, District Public Prosecutor;
R.J. Vader, Head of the Crime Prevention division of the Police Directorate at the Ministry of Justice.

(c) That the chairman may have the committee meetings attended by persons who can be expected to make an expert contribution.

- (d) That this order shall be published in the Government Gazette and in the General Police Journal and shall become operative one day after its publication in the Government Gazette.

The Hague, 21 December 1979
THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE,

The Hague, 21 December 1979
THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS,

MINISTRY OF JUSTICE

MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
Police Directorate
Crime Prevention Division
No. 1469 C 579

MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS
Departmental Division: D.G.-O.C.V.
Police Directorate
No. EA79/3898

THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE
AND
THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS

Whereas it is desirable in dealing with crime prevention questions to involve groupings and organisations concerned in the community;

ORDER:

Section 1

There shall be a National Crime Prevention Contact Committee, hereinafter called the committee.

Section 2

The committee's terms of reference shall be:

- (a) to take cognizance of the developments in crime and of the possibilities of preventing this;
- (b) to take cognizance of government policy on crime prevention;
- (c) to advise the Minister of Justice and Home Affairs, hereinafter called the Minister, on request or upon their own initiative, on measures to be taken by the authorities for the prevention of crime and on the elimination of obstacles to the implementation of measures already taken;
- (d) to put forward wishes existing in the groupings represented on the committee and in the community in general with respect to crime prevention;

- (e) to make proposals for setting up a permanent assistance and advisory group in conformity with Sec. 87 of the Constitution.

Section 3

In performing its duties the committee will be supported, inter alia, by the results of scientific research carried out or documentary material collected by the authorities and others.

It may approach official bodies, public and private organisations directly in order to obtain information it considers desirable.

Section 4

The committee may set up working parties from among its members to deal with specific subjects.

Section 5

The committee and the working parties formed from its members are empowered to seek the assistance of persons who can be expected to make an expert contribution.

Section 6

In consultation with the committee we may designate officials to assist the committee with its activities.

Section 7

The committee shall consist of a maximum of twenty members including the chairman and the secretary. They shall be appointed and may be dismissed by us.

Section 8

The chairman and the members of the committee are required to observe secrecy concerning whatever comes to their knowledge from official sources in performing their duties if and in so far as they know or ought reasonably to know that the information provided is of a confidential nature.

Section 9

The committee shall, subject to our approval, draw up rules of procedure.

This order shall be inserted in the Government Gazette.

The Hague, 21 December 1979

THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE,

The Hague, 21 December 1979

THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS,