Safeguarding Sustainable Crime Prevention

18

The Rocky Case of the Netherlands

JAN VAN DIJK
PAUL VAN SOOMEREN
JAAP DE WAARD

Contents

Learning Outcomes

After reading this chapter, you should be able to

- Explain why crime prevention next to law enforcement and criminal justice requires special structures to be sustainable
- Describe the characteristics of the three phases in the institutionalization of crime prevention in the Netherlands since 1970
- Identify the two-dimensional typology of crime prevention promoted by the Directorate of Dutch Crime Prevention at the Ministry of Justice and distinguish between the nine different types of crime prevention

- Understanding the factors that have led to the decline of special structures for crime prevention after 2000
- Understand the importance of public–private partnerships for sustainable crime prevention
- Understand the cyclical nature of crime, and why governments should maintain crime prevention structures in order to be prepared for the next crime cycle.

Introduction

> The implementation of 'tried and tested' prevention practice however remains obstinately patchy and inconsistent. Why do we find it so difficult to replicate successful programmes? Why is it that we can't run programmes like say MacDonald's run their business?

> **Nigel Whiskin**
> *Former CEO of Crime Concern, UK*
> *(Guestblog 08-18-2011 on www.waller.org)*

In the opening lines of the 2002 UN Guidelines on Crime Prevention, this policy concept is introduced as an alternative, new approach to the problems of crime:

> Effective, responsible crime prevention enhances the quality of life of all citizens. It has long-term benefits in terms of reducing the costs associated with the formal criminal justice system, as well as other social costs that result from crime. Crime prevention offers opportunities for a humane and more cost-effective approach to the problems of crime. (United Nations 2002)

If war, in the famous words of Prussian general and military theorist Carl von Clauswitz (1780–1831),* is the continuation of diplomacy with other means, crime prevention, in the view of the UN Guidelines, is the opposite. It is the pursuance of the war on crime with nonpunitive, more benign means. This definition of crime prevention brings to the fore both its obvious political appeal—who would be opposed to a policy that is both more humane and more cost-effective than the conventional punishment of offenders?—and its fundamental operational challenge: which institution can ensure the implementation of this new policy replacing or supplementing law enforcement and criminal justice? Who are the natural ambassadors of this welcome alternative to the war on crime?

Although the initial drafts aimed at the imposition of due, normative principles on the branching out of criminal justice into the unchartered

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* See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carl_von_Clausewitz.

**BOX 18.1   HIGHLIGHTS OF CRIME
PREVENTION INITIATIVES IN THE UNITED
KINGDOM BETWEEN 1980 AND 2000**

The following is a chronological sampling of some of the major crime prevention initiatives introduced during the Home Office's Safe Cities Program.

- 1980: Deployment of Crime Prevention officers by police forces and multiagency cooperation between police and local authority agencies
- 1887: Ministerial Group of Crime Prevention
- 1988: Safer Cities Programme established by Home Office Crime Prevention Unit ($n = 3600$ in 1990)
- 1989: Establishment of Crime Concern, cofounded by corporate world; Youth Action Groups projects ($n = 650$ in 1994)
- 1994: Safer Cities Programme relaunched as Single Regeneration Programme under responsibility of the Department of the Environment
- 1998: Crime and Disorder Bill of New Labour, introducing Anti-social Behavior Orders and Parenting Orders
- 2000: Zero tolerance policing

fields of crime prevention, the ultimate drafters of the guidelines appear to have been more concerned about the challenges facing the implementation of this new policy.* The largest part of the guidelines lay down not the normative principles of crime prevention but the ground rules for its sustainable implementation. This is unsurprising considering that around 2000, when the guidelines were finalized, major initiatives such as the French National Council of Crime Prevention, the US National Crime Prevention Council, Crime Concern and the Safer Cities Programme in the UK (see Box 18.1), the Directorate of Crime Prevention at the Dutch Ministry of Justice, and the Permanent Secretariat of Crime Prevention at the Interior Ministry in Belgium, as well as the International Centre for Crime Prevention in Canada had all been downsized or, in the case of the Dutch Directorate, disbanded altogether. It is against this sobering background that the final drafters, many

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* The drafters included, for example, Gloria Laycock (formerly Home Office UK), Irwin Waller (formerly ICPC, Canada), Leoluca Orlando (formerly mayor of Palermo), and Jan Van Dijk (formerly Ministry of Justice, NL, and, at the time, director of the Centre of International Crime Prevention/UNODC in Vienna).

of whom had worked for one of the institutions just mentioned, included a mundane article like the following: "Crime prevention requires adequate resources, including funding for structures and activities, in order to be sustained."

In the terminology of the policy cycle, any new policy concept passes through the stages of Agenda Setting, Policy Formulation, Legitimization, Implementation, Evaluation, and, finally, Policy Maintenance, Succession, or Termination (Cairney 2013). Crime prevention policy in the Western world has gone rapidly through the stages of Agenda Setting and Policy Formulation around the mid-1980s, and duly acquired, around 1990, the necessary Political Legitimization. Policy Formulation soon followed in the form of adopted National Strategies or special laws.* In several Western countries, crime prevention subsequently moved into the stage of Implementation, by the establishment of one or more full-fledged organizations to take responsibility for delivery. Finally, the stage of Evaluation seems to have been passed with honors around 2000 with the publication of several comprehensive and high-quality evaluation studies. Many forms of crime prevention were found to be both successful and cost-effective (see Chapter XX)[†] and considerably more humane than conventional interventions to boot.[‡] This was proven in particular for programs introducing situational crime prevention measures (Guerette 2009) or early interventions in at-risk families (Farrington and West 2003; Waller 2006).[§] Crime prevention seemed destined to become a key permanent feature of counter crime policies.

The final question, then, is how the new policy of crime prevention fared in the final stage in the policy cycle, that of Policy Maintenance, Succession, or Termination? The implementation advice given in the UN Guidelines can, with hindsight, be read as the somewhat desperate plea of experts worrying that, without renewed political support, many of the new crime prevention programs, however favorably evaluated, might not be sustainable in the long run. Since the adoption of the UN Guidelines, crime prevention in the Western world has, in our estimation, seen more termination or succession of

Please provide appropriate data.

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* A prime example of a law on crime prevention is the law of 1972 establishing the Swedish Council of Crime Prevention, which has been the model of similar legislation in other Scandinavian countries as well as in some Central and Eastern European countries.

† In the Netherlands, the costs and benefits of built-in devices to prevent household burglary and car theft have been favorably assessed by economists (Van Ours and Vollaard 2015; Vollaard and Van Ours 2011).

‡ Examples are the studies of the Home Office Research Centre and the Police Research Group (Laycock and Heal 1989; Mayhew et al. 1976), the Research and Documentation Centre of the Dutch Ministry of Justice (Van Dijk and De Waard 1991) and, in the United States, the Rand Corporation (Greenwood et al. 1996; Sherman et al. 1997) as well as the cost–benefit analyses by the Centre for Policy Analysis (Aos et al. 2001, 2004).

§ In the Netherlands, the costs and benefits of built-in devices to prevent household burglary and car theft have been favorably assessed by economists (Van Ours and Vollaard 2015; Vollaard and Van Ours 2011).

programs than their maintenance, leave alone their expansion. An overview of experiences with crime prevention in a selection of European countries (Crawford 2009) conveys a picture of disintegration of support structures and decline of resources (see Box 18.2). The **European Crime Prevention Network** of the European Union (EU), meant as a powerhouse for crime prevention in the EU, seems, with the transfer of its secretariat from the Commission to the Belgium Ministry of the Interior in 2010, to have barely survived.

The international decline of crime prevention in so many countries begs the question which factors have propelled the sudden rise of crime prevention as a new policy concept in the 1980s and 1990s of the last century, and which factors have been instrumental in its subsequent stagnation or decline thereafter.

**BOX 18.2   CRIMPREV INFO N°16BIS—
COMPARATIVE MODELS OF CRIME
PREVENTION AND DELIVERY: THEIR GENESIS,
INFLUENCE, AND DEVELOPMENT**

ADAM CRAWFORD (2008)

"There was some considerable consensus that the distinct models that preoccupied debate in the 1980s were less relevant today. Many countries appeared to have moved towards hybrid models, with a greater emphasis on pragmatism and evidence-based policy (at least at the level of rhetoric) and less emphasis on ideological fault-lines.

Many countries in their own developmental trajectories exhibited ambiguous shift and movements which could not be understood in terms of any unilinear trend. The strong influence of politics was evident in the paths taken within many jurisdictions.

The problem of political 'hyper-activity' was identified. There was a sense for some that there had been 'too much change' and that many of the initiatives had not been given sufficient time to bed down and produce long-term effects.

There were perceptions that in reflecting on developments, some of the optimism and early aspirations as to the impact of prevention policies on criminal justice systems had not been fully realised. However, some commentators remained optimistic about the future prospect for development.

There was some agreement that the delivery of holistic partnerships had proved particularly difficult to realise given the departmental boundaries between key organisations and agencies and reluctance on the part of some to participate in joint ventures."

In this chapter, we will examine this issue with an in-depth case study of the institutional history of crime prevention in the Netherlands between 1965 and 2015. We will document how crime prevention in the Netherlands went through the usual stages of the policy cycle between 1965 and 2015, and examine which factors have shaped its ever-changing arrangements. More specifically, we will try to identify which factors seem to have been responsible for the downfall of many of the support structures for crime prevention after 2000. Although aware of the idiosyncratic nature of much what has been occurred in the Netherlands in this field, we will try to draw out some "lessons learned" that might be of interest to those committed to the promotion of crime prevention in other places in the world, now or in the future.

Police-Based Crime Prevention as a First Response to the Boom in Crime: 1970–1985

From 1960 onward, crime in the Netherlands continued to rise steeply for three decades. Police registrations show that the absolute numbers of recorded crime went up from 100,000 crimes per year in 1960 to well more than 1 million in 1985. Parallel to this upward trend in recorded crime, the percentages of recorded crimes cleared by the police went down from 70% in 1955 to 25% in 1985 (see Figure 18.1).

The rise of crime volume, and a call for law and order, emerged for the first time as a political issue in the national elections of 1971 (Beernink/CHU).

Crime boom in the Netherlands
Black line = police registered crime, index 1950 = 100 (left axis)
Gray line = clearance rate (right axis)

Figure 18.1 Trends in recorded crime and clearance rates in the Netherlands between 1950 and 2008.

At the same time, conventional law enforcement became the object of strident critiques from political parties of the New Left and from renowned criminologists. In response to widely shared concerns about a crisis in crime control, the Dutch Ministry of Justice first established a full-fledged research center, the Research and Documentation Centre in 1972. One of the first priorities of the center was the launch of a large-scale victimization survey in 1973 (Smit and Van Dijk 2014; Van Dijk and Steinmetz 1979). The main policy implication of the survey was that volume crime had become rampant and remained largely hidden from the police. The initial policy response from the Ministry of Justice to the boom in crime was the establishment in 1973 of a committee tasked to propose a set of priorities in the investigative efforts of the police (Commissie Verbaliseringsbeleid Misdrijven). The committee identified the types of crime that could possibly be given less attention by investigation departments of the police (e.g., shoplifting, vandalism, and bicycle theft). In the meantime, the Directorate of Police and several municipal police forces had taken up an interest in advising the public on target hardening against much occurring types of crime like vandalism and burglary. The Criminal Investigation Advisory Committee advised the Ministers of Justice and Interior that the country was in urgent need of more crime prevention policies and that the establishment of a national body for this purpose was desirable. Following this advice, the ministers adopted in 1970 the Police Crime Prevention Regulations, which provided the statutory basis for a national organization for the prevention of crime with a national office at the Ministry of Justice, a dozen regional offices, and local crime prevention units in the municipal police forces and the districts of the State Police. The national office developed special prevention concepts like Property Marking and Neighborhood Watch, which were then rolled out nationally through its regional and local bureaus. The organization also developed the first standards for household security. A key function of the organization was the transfer of knowledge through training courses, manuals, and a regular consultation structure (including work meetings at the national and regional levels). By the mid-1980s, several hundred police officers were active locally, regionally, or nationally in this police-based crime prevention structure.

Administrative Crime Prevention: Engaging Other Ministries and Local Authorities (1985–1995)

In the early 1980s, petty crime had, according to both police statistics and victimization surveys, continued to increase steeply and now gave rise to heated political debates among the mainstream political parties. In 1983, the center-right government established an Advisory Committee on Petty Crime, requested to come up with a set of recommendations to address the

rise in crime.* In the winter of 1984, this committee published a report that heralded a new consensus among the main political parties, including the Labour Party, about both diagnosis and cure. While acknowledging victimization by crime as a serious social problem affecting broad sectors of society, the report rejected a mere expansion of the criminal justice system as a viable response to the problem of volume crime. Its key message was that juvenile delinquency and other forms of volume crime had grown from a weakening of informal social controls in an urbanized, consumerist, and secular society, and should primarily be tackled by reintroducing contemporary modes of informal or semiformal social control. Its recommendations were a strengthening of the national government's commitment to crime prevention, the involvement of intermediary structures such as schools and sports clubs, and businesses, and interagency cooperation at the central and local levels of government (Van Dijk and Junger-Tas 1988). The new type of crime prevention that went far beyond police-based target hardening advice was called **administrative crime prevention**. It had gone from Agenda Setting to Legitimization within less than a year.

The recommendations of the "all-party" committee were favorably received by all main political parties and, within months, came to constitute the cornerstone of the government's anticrime policies as formulated in the White Paper "Samenleving en Criminaliteit" (*Society and Crime*) in 1985. Within months, the new concept of crime prevention went from Legitimization into the stage of Policy Formulation and even Implementation. As announced in the white paper, an Interministerial Committee for Crime Prevention was set up comprising high-level representatives of the Ministries of Justice and Interior and several other key ministries, under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General of the Prime Minister's office. It administered a fund of 25 million euros to permit local authorities to mount crime prevention programs in the period 1986–1990. Almost all larger towns appointed crime prevention coordinators to draft proposals for projects and to oversee their implementation. During the period 1986–1990, some 200 local projects were subsidized. Ten percent of the total budget was earmarked for independent evaluation, mainly by university-based research institutes (Willemse 1996).

Under a new, center-left administration, the secretariat of the Interministerial Committee was in 1989 upgraded to a full-fledged Directorate of Crime Prevention at the Ministry of Justice. The existing National Bureau

* The committee, established by Frits Korthals Altes, a minister of the VVD, was chaired by Hein Roethof, a former Member of Parliament of the Labour Party, known for his liberal ideas about crime control. Members included experts from different political parties, including the future, threefold Minister of Justice Ernst Hirsch Ballin (CDA) and Jaqueline Soetendorp (D'66), as well as Jan Van Dijk, at the time head of the Research and Documentation Centre of the Ministry of Justice.

Table 18.1 Schematic Representation of the Different Types of Crime Prevention and Examples

	Primary General Application	Secondary Risk Groups At-Risk Neighborhoods	Tertiary Problem Groups Hot Places/Victims
Offender	• Teaching of norms • Truancy prevention • Support for disadvantaged groups	• Early intervention, for example, parenting support	• Reintegration • Alternative sanctions • Repeat offender projects
Situational	• Building regulations • In-built car security	• Caretakers in apartment buildings (concierges) • Neighborhood wardens, city guards, surveillance in industrial sites	• Policies and regulations in entertainment areas • Cameras at hotspots at crime primetime
Victim	• Awareness raising for schoolchildren • Self-defense training for girls and women	• Instructions for personnel of banks, shops (inoculation) • Neighborhood watch	• Prevention of repeat victimization • Victim support

of the police-based crime prevention organization was incorporated in this Directorate.* The Directorate, consisting of 40 or more professional staff, disposed of an annual budget of 15 million euros to promote crime prevention programs. With this directorate, the implementation of the new policy had become institutionalized as a key governmental function.

The newly established Directorate consisted of departments for situational and offender-oriented crime prevention, respectively, and a small unit for supporting services for crime victims, including **Victim Support** Netherlands. Building on the well-known typology in preventive medicine, the Directorate distinguished between primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention (also see the Introduction in this volume). In addition to this dimension, the Directorate applied another threefold classification—offender-focused, victim-focused, and situational measures. Table 18.1 shows

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* In 1992, the existing infrastructure of the police-based crime prevention organization was officially disbanded as part of a major reorganization setting up 25 regional police forces, replacing the municipal forces and the state police. It was felt that the regional police forces would need no support from a central unit in carrying out preventive activities. As will be discussed later, this decision has resulted in a radical decline of police-based crime prevention.

a schematic representation of the nine different types of crime prevention promoted by the Directorate with examples of concrete projects.

One of the key initial focuses of the directorate was the strengthening of semiformal social control or surveillance in the public and semipublic domain: City Guards, extra inspectors in public transport, and caretakers in crime-ridden high-rise apartment buildings (Hesseling 1995). An essential element of these projects was the joint tackling of three social problems: unemployment, crime, and resulting feelings of insecurity in the public domain (Willemse 1996). Building on the expertise on technical crime prevention within the Dutch police, the Police Label for Safe and Secure Housing was introduced, a sophisticated version of the UK Secured by Design label (Jongejan and Woldendorp 2013). The standardization of household security requirements would later result in the adoption of a set of minimum requirements in the Building Code (Vollaard and van Ours 2011) (see Box 18.3).

The new wave of administrative crime prevention was not exclusively situational or victim centered. Almost half of the funded projects were directed at potential or actual offenders. Pilot projects focused on reducing truancy and better achievements in secondary schools through improved recording systems and early contacting of parents (Van Dijk and Junger-Tas 1988).

BOX 18.3   REGULATION OF BUILT-IN SECURITY IN THE NETHERLANDS

The Police Label for Safe and Secure Housing was incrementally developed by the police-based crime prevention organization. Certification was done by experts working for the local police. At present, this function is executed by the municipalities. Some municipalities urged project developers to adopt the measures—although they did not have the legal means to enforce their application. Secured by Design exceeds the requirements of the Building Code 1999, by also encompassing burglary-proof garage doors, unobstructed views on parking lots, and no free access to back alleys.

The new Building Code regulating built-in home security came into force on January 1, 1999. As of that date, home builders can only obtain a building permit if they meet the legal requirements for built-in security. The criteria are spelled out in the law in great detail. Home builders are obliged to use certified burglary-proof locks and window and door frames. Certified materials can be identified by a hallmark showing two stars. The law prescribes which parts of the home need to be fitted with secured doors and windows, excluding those that cannot easily be reached by burglars.

Another signature program was the nationwide introduction of community service as diversionary option for minors (the so-called **HALT** option) (see Box 18.4). Minors arrested for minor crimes for the first time were referred to special agencies that arranged the carrying out of voluntary work after school hours or in the weekend, for example, cleaning the floor of the department store where they committed shoplifting or cleaning graffiti from busses. Evaluation studies have shown favorable recidivism rates among former clients of the HALT bureaus (Van Hees 1998).

As part of its implementation strategy, the Directorate set up a database with current projects and their first results and launched a journal on crime prevention with a distribution among 20,000 practitioners. It also introduced an annual award for the most successful project, which later inspired the current Prevention Award of the EU. In 1992, the Directorate was given the additional task of screening companies with limited liability as a means to prevent infiltration of the legitimate economy by (associates of) organized crime groups. To this end, a database was set up of all Dutch limited companies, listing their board members and owners as well as records of past

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BOX 18.4   HALT PROGRAMME—THE NETHERLANDS

Halt is a Dutch organization with a national network of offices that aims to prevent and combat juvenile crime. The crime prevention activities of Halt consist of advisory services, educational programs, and the development and implementation of crime prevention projects. The activities are carried out at local and regional levels. Halt is also responsible for the enforcement of alternative punishment given to young people up to the age of 18. Approximately half of the juveniles arrested by the Dutch police are referred to one of the Halt offices to undertake a Halt program. Juveniles aged 12 to 18 years, who have been apprehended by the police for vandalism, theft (e.g., shoplifting), or fireworks nuisance have a choice between the criminal justice system and the Halt program. If they decide to take the Halt program, they can right their wrongs while avoiding contact with criminal justice authorities. The Dutch Public Prosecution Service (OM) has laid down rules for the content and scope of the Halt program. The Halt program has a remarkable success rate: more than 90% of the juveniles complete the Halt program successfully. A successful Halt program requires that

- Juveniles and their parents accept such participation
- Juveniles comply in full with the arrangements
- Juveniles have no serious, underlying problems.

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bankruptcies and criminal convictions (T.M.C. Asser Instituut 2000). In 1992, the Ministry of Justice institutionalized collaboration on crime prevention with the business world by setting up the National Platform of Crime Control. The platform launched several joint ventures, including the still existing Foundation Tackling Vehicle Crime.

Coalitions of the Willing: 1995–2015

In the mid-1990s, the Dutch government embarked on a general strategy of decentralization of responsibilities and budgets to local authorities. One of the areas where decentralization was found to be desirable was crime prevention. This resulted in the decision to transfer the responsibility for situational crime prevention from the newly established Directorate for Crime Prevention to the Ministry of the Interior. At the same time, the new government launched a new program on security, under the supervision of the Secretary of Interior, who was also responsible for urban renewal. The Ministry of the Interior had earlier introduced the concept of Integrated Security Policy, which broadened the subject matter to include, besides crime, road accidents, fires, and disasters, which had always been the responsibility of local government (Ministry of Interior 1994). Within the Ministry of Justice, the remaining functions of the Directorate on Crime Prevention were integrated into a new Directorate for Youth Policies and Crime Prevention, mainly tasked with the execution of sanctions for young offenders, including HALT.

Situational crime prevention continued to be supported in projects of the just mentioned National Platform. Modeled after the National Platform, a dozen larger cities established their own local platforms to promote public–private partnerships in crime prevention. To support these initiatives, a National Centre for Crime Prevention and Security was set up in 2004, co-funded by the business sector and the Ministries of Justice and the Interior. Its key tasks are gathering information and dissemination of best practices on tackling crime problems at the local level and in specific areas of the business sector. The Centre promotes, besides the Police Label for Safe and Secure Housing and the certification of safe entrepreneurship, the prevention of violence in the leisure industry. It also supports initiatives such as codes of ethics for companies and the prevention of employee theft.

A new trend in the discourse on crime and crime prevention since 2000 is the identification of so-called hardcore youth offenders. These are young persons, many of whom belonging to ethnic minorities, who chronically commit a variety of serious crimes including violent offenses (Van Gemert et al. 2008). In response to this new priority, crime prevention became more focused on tertiary offender-oriented prevention. In a project in Rotterdam, drug addicts highly active in crime were given vocational training and work

experience during a two-year secured, in-house program as an alternative to a prison sentence (i.e., Strafrechtelijke Opvang Verslaafden). This project, initially cofounded with the city of Rotterdam, was later transformed in a nationwide program for habitual criminals. A new law introduced a special detention sentence of up to two years for highly active offenders. This project was found to have contributed significantly to the fall in drugs-related property crimes in the country (Vollaard 2013).

In several towns, experiments were initiated with **intensive probation supervision**. Young people who complete the program were offered jobs under the municipal employment schemes. The best-known project in Amsterdam, called New Perspectives, processed several hundred young people per year following a problem-oriented approach and achieved good results (Van Burik et al. 1999). This project was in 2013 remodeled in a more punitive mode by the Mayor of Amsterdam as the Project Top 600, targeting the most active young offenders in the city with a combination of sanctions and social services.

Several larger cities have established centers that bring together police, prosecutors, and municipal agencies responsible for youth work, social work, and health. These centers are called **Security Houses**. In 2015, 25 such centers were active, under the shared responsibility of the Public Prosecutor's Office and the municipalities, and co-funded by the Ministry of Security and Justice. One of the priority tasks of the Security Houses is the prevention of partner violence through risk assessments and the imposition of administrative eviction orders from the mayors for abusive partners.

Seen from a bird's eye view, the newer crime prevention initiatives are predominantly of a tertiary offender–based nature. At the same time, some situational crime prevention initiatives have been integrated into regular procedures, laws, and (building) codes. Victim Support Netherlands has evolved in a powerful national organization with a professional staff of several hundred and thousands of volunteers.* This organization supports more than 100,000 victims of crime annually and is one of the largest of its kind in the world.

The State of the Art in 2016

The "state of the art" of crime prevention governance in the Netherlands in 2016 shows, as in many other countries, a picture of institutional setbacks and fragmentation. At the level of the central government, the former Ministry of Justice, renamed Ministry of Security and Justice, has taken over

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* See www.slachtofferhulp Nederland.

responsibility for the function of policing, which, since 2013, is executed by a unified National Police Force. This concentration offers, in theory, improved opportunities for the promotion of crime prevention. This opportunity has so far not been harnessed. Since 2010, the ministers responsible for the newly created mammoth ministry have presented themselves as champions of punitive criminal policies and their criminal policies have stressed repression over prevention. In fact, the very concept of crime prevention has not been mentioned in any of their policy plans, or in any of the regular annual plans of the Ministry of Security and Justice. Within the ministry, supervising the full range of law enforcement and criminal justice, no directorate carries crime prevention in its name.* Only the function of tertiary offender–oriented prevention is mentioned as one of the key tasks, namely, of the Directorate for Sanctions and Youth. Since the focus of this type of crime prevention is on the treatment of (persistent) offenders, it bears little resemblance to crime prevention proper, as defined in the United Nations Guidelines.

The recent and rapid demise of crime prevention as a distinct policy responsibility of the Ministry does not imply that no crime prevention initiatives are taken in practice. Arguably, elements of crime prevention have been mainstreamed into comprehensive crime control programs. Mention was already made of eviction orders for abusive partners to prevent partner violence. To prevent infiltration of the local economy by organized crime groups, legislation was passed in 2002, offering public bodies access to criminal records and investigative information (Law to Facilitate Integrity Checks of Companies by Public Bodies of 2002/BIBOB). Such administrative measures can be regarded as new forms of crime prevention. Also, situational crime prevention initiatives continue to be implemented. A nationwide program tackling the high impact crime of household burglary, for example, combines targeted criminal investigations with the promotion of high-quality security locks in social housing estates through a co-funding arrangement with housing associations.

Of the institutional structures for crime prevention, established in the 1990s, the National Platform for Crime Prevention is still active, though its highest echelon meets irregularly. Prevention of vehicle thefts continues to be promoted by the independent foundation established by the said Platform in 1996, and the Centre for Crime Prevention and Community Safety (CCV) continues to provide technical support, for example, by updating and promoting established instruments such as the security certification of houses and of commercial centers (see Box 18.5).

At the municipal level, the function of crime prevention coordinator, of which a hundred or so existed around 1990, has largely disappeared.

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* See https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/ministerie-van-veiligheid-en-justitie.

BOX 18.5   INTRODUCING THE CENTRE FOR CRIME PREVENTION AND COMMUNITY SAFETY

The CCV develops and implements coherent instruments designed to enhance community safety. The CCV stimulates cooperation between public and private organizations to achieve a coordinated, integrated approach to crime prevention and reduction, and forms a bridge between policy and practice. The CCV manages and develops standards for fire alarm systems, CCTV, small fire extinguishers, public–private partnerships on business parks and shopping centers (Keurmerk Veilig Ondernemen), household security (Politiekeurmerk Veilig Wonen), sprinklers and watering systems, alarm systems, and alarm receiving centers.

By the certificate "Keurmerk Veilig Ondernemen," participants can demonstrate the effective management of their public–private partnership. By the cooperation of public and private parties, the social cohesion of these parties increases. This improves the security situation and thus the perceived safety of users of business parks and shopping centers. The evaluation by the certification body makes the collaboration that is entered into more binding. This leads to continuous initiatives to achieve the objectives of the public–private partnership.

For more information, see www.hetccv.nl.

Discernible units with a remit for crime prevention or urban security exist in Amsterdam and Rotterdam only. In both cities, various forms of crime prevention, such as the screening of companies, are important parts of the programs against organized crime groups infiltrating the local economy (Huisman and Nelen 2007).* These two cities also run special programs tackling high-intensive career criminals that combine punitive and rehabilitative measures. Interestingly, the concept of Neighborhood Watch, introduced in the 1980s, has recently reemerged as spontaneous, private initiatives (**Neighborhood Watch 2.0**) in many Dutch cities. The number is estimated to be 700 or more and has grown rapidly since 2010. In Tilburg, neighborhood groups have successfully piloted the use of WhatsApp groups as a surveillance tool. Tellingly, the organizational support for these citizens' initiatives lies with the municipality and not, as in the past, with the police (Lub 2016).

The police-based crime prevention organization, once comprising a hierarchical structure composed of hundreds of specialized officers, was formally dismantled in 1992. In 2006, the Council of Police Commissioners formally

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* In Rotterdam, prosecutors have in 2015 taken the initiative to back up the fight against organized crime in Rotterdam South with awareness-raising drama classes in primary schools attended by pupils at risk to be recruited by criminal groups.

declared that crime prevention was no longer part of the core business of polic-ing in the Netherlands. A head count in 2009 revealed that, nationwide, no more than a handful of police officers with crime prevention expertise were still in function. In one of the former districts, Hollands Midden, for example, the number went down from 11 in 1993 to 0.5 in 2012 (Van Nieuwaal and Beunders 2010). The annual Dutch victimization surveys confirm that the per-centages of reporting victims who receive crime prevention advice from the police have significantly decreased (Van Dijk et al. 2012b).* Proposals by the first two authors to concentrate crime prevention expertise within the newly established National Police fell on deaf ears, and in recent policy plans of the National Police, any reference to the concepts of crime prevention will be searched in vain. The Dutch police, once boasting a full-fledged crime preven-tion organization, have gone back to the basics of surveillance and criminal investigation. The refocusing on core functions of policing has not yet resulted in improved effectiveness of criminal investigation. Clearance rates of total crime have remained at an all-time low of 23%, and the proportion of court cases ending in acquittals because of poorly collected evidence has gone up.

To conclude, except for a few situational measures/approaches (e.g., police label, antiburglary requirements for residential housing, technical antitheft requirements for cars) which have been given a statutory basis, few of the support structures and programs of crime prevention, developed between 1975 and 1995, have been maintained. Most programs have been terminated and succeeded by more punitive programs of crime control. The once extensive structures for police-based crime prevention in the country have simply ceased to exist. Within the Ministry of Security and Justice, crime prevention is no longer promoted as a separate policy. Expertise on sit-uational crime prevention implementation has been retained, thanks mainly to public–private partnerships with the business sector. In the largest Dutch cities, notably Amsterdam and Rotterdam, the tradition of crime prevention seems to have survived, but only in the narrow form of Security Houses, Top Hundred projects, and the integrity screening of companies.

Analysis and Lessons Learned

Our conclusion is that crime prevention, as a new type of policy, has been in decline in the Netherlands since 2000. This raises the pertinent question

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* The provision of person-to-person crime prevention advice to households reporting a burglary is a proven crime prevention measure (Farrell and Pease 1993). The provision of advice to reporting victims of crimes on how to prevent repeat victimization has the potential to reduce crime and might be one of the most powerful opportunities to increase trust in the police.

what political factors have determined its rise and fall over the past five decades. A common interpretation of the decline of crime prevention is that this is caused by the so-called punitive turn in criminal policies in the 1990s (Garland 2001). In the case of the Netherlands, all ministers of justice since 2000, with a brief intermezzo between 2007 and 2009,* have indeed unequivocally advocated punitive responses to existing or perceived crime problems. In their election campaign of 2010, the conservative Liberal Party VVD campaigned for "More Blue in the Streets" and "Offenders Are Going to Pay." The two VVD politicians leading the new Ministry of Security and Justice between 2008 and 2015 projected an image of themselves as stern crime fighters. Whether this political rhetoric reflects a punitive turn in Dutch criminal policy seems doubtful. Careful analyses of trends in sentencing have shown that sentencing tariffs by the Dutch courts for key categories of crime have, for example, changed very little since 2003 (Berghuis 2015). It has often been argued that, in the final analysis, the only unambiguous indicator of the punitiveness of the criminal policies of a nation is its national prisoners rate. On this account, the Netherlands shows a remarkable trend. Since 2000, the prisoner rates went down from 130 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2005 to below 60 in 2015 (Aebi et al. 2016; Van Dijk 2010). With the current rate, the Netherlands has reclaimed its traditional place among the least punitive countries in the Western world, in the company of the Scandinavian countries and Switzerland. Crime prevention has certainly become less pivotal, but whether this forms part of a fundamental punitive turn in the country remains a moot point. In an international perspective, it seems far-fetched to speak of a punitive turn in a country detaining less than half the numbers of prisoners per capita as the United Kingdom, and less than a tenth of the numbers in the United States.

The second possible interpretation that comes to mind is that heavy top-down structures for crime prevention at the level of central government went against the general political trend toward decentralization of government function as a means to bring policymaking closer to the people. From the outset, both police- and criminal justice–based support structures for crime prevention were resisted by the Ministry of the Interior, which feared for the autonomy of municipal authorities in maintaining public order and controlling local crime. This source of opposition gained political ground and, in fact, prevailed

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* In 2007, the new coalition government consisting of Christian democrats and Labour issued a new program called Safety Begins with Prevention (Ministries of Justice and the Interior 2007). In an introductory statement, the new Minister of Justice Ernst Hirsch Ballin wrote that crime control could no longer be regarded as the sole responsibility of police and justice and that many other government agencies at all levels have important roles to play. Although this policy plan suggests a rebirth of the crime prevention philosophy of the 1980s, it has not led to a restrengthening of support structures within the ministry or elsewhere and seems to have had little lasting influence.

when decentralization became an official political priority of the government around 1995, propelled by politicians of the left Liberal Party D'66 and the Labour Party. With the integration of security policies in programs of urban renewal, or specifically empowerment of the most vulnerable neighborhoods in the country, support structures promoting specific social policies top-down, such as the Directorate of Crime Prevention, went blatantly against the political tide. Similar political dynamics had led in 1988 in France to the integration of the National Council on Crime Prevention (Le Conseil National de Prévention de la Délinquance) into an Interministerial Committee on Cities (La Delegation Interministerielle à la Ville) and the integration of Crime Prevention Contracts into comprehensive Urban Problem Contracts. In the United Kingdom, as mentioned, the Safer Cities Programme was relaunched in 1994 as Single Regeneration Programme. Its focus on situational measures was diluted and results in terms of crime reduction were disappointing (Knox et al. 2000).

In theory, crime prevention policies can be left to the local level (mayors or other local authorities), as propagated by the Paris-based European Forum on Urban Security. However, misgivings that such fully decentralized crime prevention policies will be unsustainable, without technical and financial support from a dedicated unit in central government, have been confirmed in both France and the Netherlands. In both countries, the integration of crime prevention structures into structures addressing urban problems (or social cohesiveness) has soon resulted in a complete loss of any focus on crime problems (Crawford 1998). In France, the crime prevention grants were renamed into security grants in 1992. In 1997, the national program of security-related grants for municipalities was refocused on crime control measures, such as neighborhood policing and houses of security (Dieu 2009). From 2002 onward, under the leadership of the conservative politician Nicolas Sarkozy, the pendulum has swung back 180° to a criminal policy of undiluted punitiveness (Wyvekens 2009). In the United Kingdom, the Safer Cities Programme, migrated to the Ministry of the Environment in 1994, was discontinued in 1998 without any form of succession. In the Netherlands, municipal crime prevention has, as explained, virtually ceased to exist soon after its transfer to the Ministry of the Interior and concurrent "decentralization."

Both the punitive shift and decentralization of government have undoubtedly played a part in the decline of crime prevention. Yet, these factors cannot fully explain it. In our view, the single most important, and probably decisive, factor was that, around 2000, crime had ceased to be a threat to the well-being of citizens and profitability of businesses. As a consequence, the need of supplementing conventional criminal justice with other means lost its urgency.

When reflecting on the trajectory of crime prevention since the early 1990s, its close synchrony with the movements in volume crime is hard to miss. Political support for crime prevention has matched overall trends in crime since 1980, booming from 1985 onward, peaking around 2000, and falling steeply

thereafter. In hindsight, crime prevention in the Netherlands as a new policy concept seems to have been spawned by the emergency situation created by the prolonged crime boom of the 1970s and 1980s. Faced with chronic, and seemingly unsolvable, overburdening of its institutions by ever-increasing numbers of cases and arrested offenders, the law enforcement and criminal justice establishment felt obliged to invest in alliances with governmental and nongovernmental organizations that could address criminogenic situations in their respective operational domains. For this pragmatic reason, the Ministry of Justice initiated a police-based crime prevention organization, promoting target hardening by citizens in 1973, and, lifting its ambitions to a higher level in response to a deepening crisis, reached out to other ministries and local governments and the business community as partners in crime prevention in the mid-1980s. Principled opposition to the alignment of education, youth work, health care, and the leisure industry to the fight against crime was overruled by a shared feeling that crime and related fear of crime had to be brought under control with all possible means. Of symbolic importance in this respect is the leadership role of the Prime Minister whose Secretary-General chaired for some years the interministerial committee on crime prevention.* The readiness of large corporations to take part in the National Platform and to co-fund some of its projects has been portrayed as a manifestation of the Dutch tradition of pulling forces in times of a (nautical) crisis—known as Polderen† (Van Dijk and De Waard 2009). This interpretation, however neat, only confirms that the participation of the corporate world was first and foremost driven by the conviction that the crime crisis harmed their business interests and that this could not be remedied with conventional criminal justice means alone. As was to be expected, the readiness of the governmental and nongovernmental partners in crime prevention decreased as soon as volume crime—and the costs incurred from it—looked more manageable. From the perspective of the Ministry of Justice, support structures to forge coalitions with other governmental and nongovernmental organizations in the fight against volume crime appeared luxuries as soon as caseloads of prosecutors and courts went down and prisoner rates started tumbling, as has been the case in the Netherlands now for many years.

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* Similarly, in France, the National Council of Crime Prevention, established in 1983, was up to 1988 chaired by the Prime Minister and supported by a secretariat at the Ministry of Justice.

† A polder is a low-lying tract of land enclosed by embankments known as dikes, usually drained and reclaimed marshland, and a common feature of the Netherlands. Not coincidentally, a large proportion of all Dutch families are called Van Dijk (or Winterdijk). Ever since the Middle Ages, competing elites in the same polder were forced to set aside their differences to maintain the polders, lest they all be flooded. The common fight against the sea is seen as the root cause of Polderen, meaning the Dutch tradition of pragmatic and consensual policies (Romein and Romein-Verschoor 1943). Whether or not these instances of collaboration are indeed rooted in the cultural heritage of the polder, coalition building across religious denominations and political parties has undeniably been a characteristic of Dutch society for a long time (Lijphart 1975).

The demise of crime prevention as well as its putative cause, the punitive turn around in 2000, should be interpreted against the background of stabilizing or decreasing crime rates at the time. Around this time, volume crime had dropped so much in most Western countries that governments could afford replacing evidence-based policies by ideologically inspired tough-on-crime policies. Actually, reducing crime had ceased to be an urgent and broadly shared political priority. It is fully in line with this interpretation that, at the present juncture, interest in crime prevention seems strongest among governments of developing and middle-income countries faced with extremely serious problems of crime (Shaw 2009; Waller 2014).

Conclusion: The Future of Crime Prevention

Crime prevention was presented by many of its propagators as an ideologically inspired reform movement. In hindsight, its institutional success in a country such as the Netherlands seems to have been short lived because it was predicated on a perceived law and order crisis lasting two decades. The case of evidence-based crime prevention as a cost-effective and humane alternative to criminal justice may be strong, but not necessarily strong enough to ensure the maintenance of dedicated support structures in the long run. In an optimistic scenario, preventive measures will somehow remain at least an element in rational and humane counter crime policies. In a pessimistic scenario, crime prevention will soon be remembered as one of the ideological peculiarities of the generation of 1968.

However, our own realistic perspective on crime prevention as an emergency response to a crime epidemic suggests a third scenario. If, as argued by some criminologists, the international drops in crime have been largely caused by spontaneous or government-sponsored primary, situational crime prevention, such as large-scale car and household security (Crawford 2009; Van Dijk et al. 2012a), then crime prevention has become a victim of its own success. By effectively driving down levels of crime, crime prevention has made its own support structures superfluous.* This conclusion brings us to a final reflection on the potential for a new generation of crime prevention

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* Well-researched examples of falls in types of crime caused by improved security are those of car theft and household burglary. In the case of the Netherlands, rates of car theft were driven down by the EU Directive on immobilizers of 1999 and by the complementary activities of the foundation Tackling Vehicle theft, co-funded by the Ministry of Justice and the car industry. The promotion of better secured houses has been a constant of Dutch crime prevention policies. In 1999, security requirements became mandatory for all newly built houses through an amendment of the National Building Code. Results of the ICVS show that, in 2010, Dutch houses were the best secured in Europe, with security locks present in 85% of all houses (Van Dijk 2014).

programs in the future. According to the theoretical school explaining international crime drops as resulting from improved crime prevention, crime is a cyclical phenomenon (Van Dijk et al. 2012a). When crime rates fall, so will risk perceptions, and the willingness to invest in self-protection. After some time, potential offenders will be tempted by expanded opportunities of crime, caused by reduced investments in security and by the arrival of new, unsecured technologies, for example, in cyberspace. In due time, crime rates will again increase. As soon as private and corporate victims will have noticed that their losses of crime have become unreasonably large, they will, once again, be ready to become partners in crime prevention. At the same time, Ministries of Justice and police forces will again be hard-pressed to look out for such partners. In this view, crime prevention, though in decline now, will be in demand again as soon as the next, near unavoidable crime boom has announced itself.

To be prepared, governments are advised to keep knowledge bases on evidence-based crime prevention measures up to date and to maintain the institutional capacity to monitor where such measures need to be implemented and which coalitions to this end need to be made. If this advice is heeded, governments may not just be better placed to address a new crime boom but even be able to nip it in the bud.

Glossary of Key Terms

Administrative crime prevention: "the total of all private initiatives and state policies, other than the enforcement of criminal law, aimed at the reduction of damage caused by acts defined as criminal by the state" (Van Dijk and De Waard 1991).

European Crime Prevention Network: One of the EUCPN's main tasks is to arrange an annual conference for sharing and disseminating experience and knowledge of best practices in preventing crime and increasing safety and security in the EU. The European Crime Prevention Award is a contest that aims to reward the best European crime prevention project. The nominated projects are presented each year during the Best Practice Conference (www. eucpn.org).

Neighborhood Watch 2.0: A new generation of citizen initiatives to improve safety in the neighborhood establishing WhatsApp groups with participation of local police officers, for example, in the Dutch city of Tilburg.

Security houses: A security house is a locality from where different governmental agencies, including police, prosecutors, and municipal service providers, operate together to monitor and support persons responsible for public disorder, domestic violence, or crime in the city. A key feature of the houses is the exchange of information on the target group from all participating organizations and the coordination of interventions.

Situational crime prevention: Strategies that are aimed at reducing the criminal opportunities that arise from the routines of everyday life. Such strategies include "hardening" of potential targets, improving surveillance of areas that might attract crime (e.g., closed-circuit television surveillance), and deflecting potential offenders from settings in which crimes might occur (e.g., by limiting access of such persons to shopping malls and other locales).

Tackling the top 800 project: A project designed to incapacitate and resocialize young repeat offenders who are in need of a highly structured, closely supervised program with the involvement of many other agencies besides the police and the prison and probation services. In Amsterdam, for example, the project focuses on the 800 most active young offenders in the city.

Is the sentence "In Amsterdam, for example… in the city." correct as modified?

Target hardening: Target hardening means "making targets more resistant to attack or more difficult to remove or damage." A target is anything that an offender would want to steal or damage. It could be an object, property, person, or, in some cases, an animal. Examples of target hardening are fitting better doors, windows, or shutters; window or door locks; alarms; screens in banks; fencing systems; repairing damaged and derelict property; and fitting a wheel lock to a vehicle.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. Is crime prevention rightly presented in the United Nations Guidelines on Preventing Crime of 2002 as a cost-effective and more humane alternative to conventional means of crime control?
2. What is the state of crime prevention in your own country? Which structures are in place to promote crime prevention, and have these structures been strengthened or weakened since 2000?
3. Which institutions are or have been leading in promoting crime prevention in your country (police, cities, national/federal ministries, public–private partnerships)?
4. Which types of crime prevention are currently the most popular in your country? What is neglected or poorly implemented?
5. Is the central and local government in your country prepared to address current or coming crime booms?

Suggested Reading

Crawford, A. (ed.). (2009). *Crime Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective.* Cullompton, UK: Willan Publishing. A collection of essays on the different trajectories of crime prevention in a broad selection of European countries over the last three decades.

Van Dijk, J. (2008). *The World of Crime: Breaking the Silence on Problems of Security, Justice and Development across the World*. CA: SAGE, 2008. An introduction into comparative international criminology, highlighting differences in levels of crime, crime prevention, criminal justice, and victim assistance across the world and their impact on sustainable development.

Waller, I. (2014). *Smarter Crime Control: A Guide to a Safer Future for Citizens, Communities and Politicians*. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. An update on innovative programs to tackle endemic crime problems such as domestic violence and gun violence from an international perspective.

Recommended Web Links

www.crimesolutions.gov
www.popcenter.org
www.crime-prevention-intl.org
www.hetccv.nl/
http://whatworks.college.police.uk/toolkit/Pages/Toolkit.aspx

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